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Abstract
! Philosophers and laymen alike have often used morality to invite misconceptions of 
human life into ethics, and also of ethics into human life. The Kant/Williams discourse 
provides a rich backdrop on which to consider these misconceptions. But the misconceptions 
of morality involved are just as numerous and just as serious. One thing that the Kant/
Williams discourse shows is this: that ethics can be neither contained by nor cultivated 
without morality. Though much of Williams’ critique of Kantian morality is quite astute, the 
philosophical and ethical wisdoms of morality abound in spite of these. Morality understands 
the fundamental condition of moral loss, and the sometimes irreducible quandaries that this 
condition places human beings in. It understands the nature of the moral law, and the 
intricacies that the levels of letter and spirit invite into human life. Perhaps more importantly, 
it understands the uncompromising relationship between moral loss and moral law, and how 
the human navigation of this relationship leads into the ethical realm via giving rise to ethical 
conviction. Finally, for all of its pressures, morality abounds in valuable wisdoms for the one 
discovering that the human soul occupies a place of ethical significance in the world. It is 
responsible for pointing out, grounding and providing a framework for some of the most 
fundamental truths about the world and human beings; and these are essential to any viable 
ethical theory and sensible conception of human life.
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Preface
! In the preface to the Canto Edition of his Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, Bernard 
Williams supposes in hindsight that he got the title wrong, and that it should rather be 
“Ethics: An Introduction to Morality.”1 He meant this pseudo-revision to emphasize how 
ethics might illustrate the problems and limitations of morality. The essential claim of this 
work is that he got it quite right the first time: morality is the introduction to ethics.
! Williams was at the forefront of ethical philosophy nearing the end of the 20th century. 
During his career, he presented some of the most influential criticisms to date of Kantianism 
and Utilitarianism, and of moral philosophy in general. This work brings together over a year 
of immersion in Williams’ ethical texts, in particular his work on the morality/ethics 
relationship. This preface will serve primarily as a rough roadmap of what follows, and also as 
a sort of glossary of some notions that may require explanation before they are met in the text.
! Though Williams continues to develop his own ethical theory after his very important 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, that work brings together over a decade of Williams’ 
thoughts on morality. He levies his case against morality primarily by way of a heavy critique 
of Utilitarian and Kantian morality. The discourse with Kant is more relevant to this work, 
and is the subject of the first chapter. The first section of the chapter attempts to lay out 
Williams’ criticisms of Kant as straightforwardly as possible. Williams’ critique of Kantianism 
is here parsed into six main issues, although it is acknowledged that it might have been done a 
number of other ways. When Williams has weighed over a decade of critique, he considers 
morality to be an unfortunate variety of ethics which we would be better off without.2
! The second section continues by posing two main questions, the first of which is how 
pertinent Williams’ criticisms of Kantian morality really are. This involves getting to the heart 
of Kantian morality, and getting clear on notions such as the good will, duty, reason, 
obligation, freedom and lawfulness. This work acknowledges, without much reservation, the 
effectiveness of Williams’ criticisms of Kant. Ultimately, it seems Williams understands Kant’s 
insufficiencies quite well, and most of the criticisms probably stand, if only in a weakened 
form. While the Kant/Williams discourse provides a very rich backdrop on which to consider 
the morality/ethics relationship, it is not a major objective of this work to adjudicate any 
greater debate between these two philosophers (or their followers). The second, more 
important question of the section is whether Williams’ criticisms really warrant throwing 
morality out of human ethical life altogether - to which the response here will be negative. The 
misfirings by Williams against Kant will be important to this work, and they hint at some 
ways that an alternative view of morality (namely, morality as an introduction) might survive 
Williams’ criticisms. In particular, there is a small opening for morality left even by Williams, 
in that morality does offer one point of entry into ethics, one way of approaching ethical life (if 
only a poor one).
! The second chapter builds on dual suspicions from the first chapter that Williams’ 
criticisms against Kant might not do away with morality completely: because Williams leaves 
Kantian morality alive, and because Kant might not be representative of all morality. The most 
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fundamental question of the chapter is the essence of morality, and the most fundamental 
position of the chapter is that it is a much simpler institution than normally supposed. 
Whereas the first chapter weighs Kant and Williams mostly against each other, the second 
chapter weighs both of their conceptions of morality against what is here presented as the 
essence of morality.  The ultimate suggestion of the chapter is that both Kant and Williams 
ignore some very crucial elements of morality, and attempt to (respectively) prop it up and 
tear it down based on these misconceptions. According to this view, Kant ironically limits too 
much the reach of morality in ethics, while Williams gives it too great a reach; but both 
suggest an impartiality and impersonality that are not essential to morality. This argument 
involves some notions that ought to be introduced before they are met head on in the body of 
the work: moral loss, moral law, the letter of the moral law, and the spirit of the moral law.
! Moral loss and moral law will be initially presented as basic human intuitions, and this 
is an early place of divergence from the Kantian conception of moral law. The notion of moral 
loss has to do with the intuition that the world, and the institutions and human beings in it, are 
imperfect or at least incomplete. A basic expression of the notion is the simple intuition that all 
is not as it should be. There is room in this intuition for very serious issues, such as death, 
natural disasters and political injustice; but it also has room for more ordinary issues, such as 
one disrupting the order of a retail line, dissatisfaction with one’s material possessions, or 
things simply being contrary to one’s preferences.3 These intuitions are of course contrasted 
with equally varied intuitions concerning how things ought to be, and these can be ideals, 
standards, customs, habits or mere preferences. 
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! It does not matter so much where these ideals come from or what they rest on; rather 
what matters is that human beings have them and value them. This is, on one level, the 
presence of the moral law in what is here called the law/loss relationship, which is nothing 
more substantial than what has just been presented: that human beings have ideals that are 
disappointed in reality. The second chapter first deals primarily with this law/loss distinction 
and a few important suggestions it involves. The first of these is that moral conflicts are just 
particular expressions of the fundamental condition of moral loss. The second is that moral 
loss makes it incredibly difficult for human beings to fulfill the moral law. Third, that morality 
is present in ordinary human life, even in ways seemingly independent of reason and 
obligation. Ultimately, these combine to suggest that morality might have a much broader  and 
deeper ethical scope than it is usually granted.
! The aspect of the moral law involves a further relationship, that between the letter of 
the law and the spirit of it (which is here called the “letter/spirit” distinction). It of course 
must be acknowledged that Kant makes a (nominally) similar distinction, which brings out the 
difference between a mere outward conformity to the moral law in one’s actions, and a sincere 
reverence for it in one’s soul.4 This work for the most part holds this Kantian distinction to be 
a useful one, but also insufficient for representing the whole of the moral law. The letter/spirit 
distinction developed in this work is between utterable maxims of law which constitute its 
letter (for example, “one should not murder”), and more ethereal values of law (for example, 
the value of human life) which constitute its spirit. This letter/spirit distinction will involve a 
few suggestions of its own, which cannot fully be explained here. The first of these is that the 
difficulties which human beings experience in conforming to the letter of the law do not 
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necessarily compromise the spirit of the law, and therefore should not, as Williams supposes, 
translate to a lack of practicality in morality. The second is that generally it is the spirit of the 
law which should be favored by moral agents. Third, that the viability of moral law ultimately 
rests on what I will identify as an internal integrity of the letter/spirit distinction. What these 
two relationships - law/loss and letter/spirit - show about morality is that it might be a more 
untidy institution than philosophers usually believe. Finally, the chapter will proceed to 
suggest that despite all of this, morality is a simple institution, in that it requires only 
lawfulness directed at the good will.
! The third chapter brings together the work of the first two chapters by showing that 
human beings must navigate the law/loss and letter/spirit tensions of ethical life. It is argued 
that the primary navigation tool for such tensions is conviction, and that this is a notion that 
makes an essential connection between morality and ethics. Though it is a notion which is in 
part borrowed (and expanded) from Williams,5 it is an open-ended question of this work what 
conviction is really comprised of. Nonetheless, the final suggestion of the third chapter will be 
that morality is most properly conceived as an introduction to ethics in that its most essential 
notions teach ethical conviction. 
! Underlying this argument is of course the contemporary morality/ethics relationship. In 
the first chapter, the word “morality” is generally used to discuss Kant’s practical philosophy, 
because though Williams makes the morality/ethics distinction, it is probably anachronistic to 
attribute any such distinction to Kant. This work generally treats morality as the rule-based 
institution of ethics. As for ethics itself, this work treats it as Williams does, as the institution 
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that addresses the Socratic question of how human beings should live.6 This work puts much 
more effort into defining morality than it does ethics, and there are a few reasons for this. 
First, ethics is never clearly defined by Williams; and I have not found it necessary to do so in 
response to him. Second, the focus of this work is on what morality is, rather than what ethics 
is, or even how morality compares to ethics. Third, whatever ethics is, it surely will have 
conviction as a central feature.7 What is finally most important to this work is that morality 
cultivates conviction (and perhaps other notions), without which it would be unclear what 
sort of ethics could be developed.
! So the three basic claims of this work should be found quite simple: first, that 
Williams’ criticisms of morality do not actually eliminate it; second, that morality is a simple 
rule-based institution consisting in lawfulness aimed at the good will; and third, that morality 
is inherent in ethics due to its development of conviction. Much else of this work is left open-
ended, and the postscript of this work points in some directions that these open-ended issues 
may head.
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Morality and why we cannot save it
! It is perhaps true, as Williams supposes, that Kant offers the purest representation of 
morality8 - so if one wants to critique morality, one might sensibly turn to Kant. Despite the 
efforts of contemporary moral philosophers, morality (the rule-based ethical institution) is 
supposed by Williams to be obsolete. It has allegedly suffered too many fatal blows to be 
salvaged. It has failed to provide human beings with adequate ethical direction, and should 
thus be cast aside to make room for something more apt. Williams is perhaps the strongest 
recent advocate of such a position, and his ethical philosophy has synthesized much of the 
case against morality in a devastating case against Kant. But this case perhaps deserves 
reopening, reexamining, and re-adjudicating: whether morality is really beyond saving. This 
chapter will lay out and weigh Williams’ case against Kantian morality. Though it is certainly 
a question on the surface whether Williams succeeds against Kantian morality, the deeper 
consideration in this chapter is whether any variety of morality could survive Williams’ 
criticisms.
Kant and Williams: for and against
! Near the end of his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams brings together his long-
developed criticisms of Kantian morality with the claim that “morality makes people think 
that, without its very special obligation, there is only inclination.”9  This idea attacks six pillars 
of Kantian morality.10 First, that morality is fundamentally a practical institution. Second, that 
that particular moral obligations must be backed by general moral obligations. Third, that 
morality is pure in that it is immune to luck. Fourth, that the moral obligation is supreme, both 
in kind and in compulsion. Fifth, that morality is impersonal; and sixth, that the morality 
system misunderstands and misuses blame and guilt. These six elements of Kantian morality 
make it unacceptable to Williams, and he thus concludes that morality is a variety of ethics 
that we would be better off without. While it is a good question whether morality is something 
that ethics can be without, the present inquiry is whether Williams is correct about Kant, and 
(granted that Kant is correct about morality) what this would mean for ethics.
! The practicality of the morality system may be seen as having two levels: possibility 
and internal harmony.11 The level of possibility states that all moral demands on an individual 
can be satisfied. Accordingly, the level of internal harmony is that moral demands cannot 
conflict.12 The consequence of such a philosophy, Williams supposes, is that if moral 
deliberation concludes with an impossible or bifurcated course of action, then the deliberation 
has gone awry.13  Williams seems to take issue with this pillar of Kantian morality via 
questioning on the level of internal harmony. He observes that real, legitimate, irreducible 
moral conflicts exist.14 For Williams, this ultimately compromises any supposed idea of 
internal harmony for morality. It is important to Williams that these conflicts be understood as 
conflicts that go all the way down,15 that they cannot be rationalized away as some sort of logical 
inconsistency. The classic example that Williams raises in support is that of Agamemnon, who 
resolved to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia in order to gain the favor of the god Artemis in 
war against the Trojans.16 Agamemnon faces a situation of real moral conflict because there 
seems to be no morally preferable course of action for him to follow. The fact and depth of this 
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conflict is supported by the ineliminable regret that Agamemnon feels afterwards.17 According 
to Williams, this regret cannot and should not be rationalized away; and this shows the 
irreducibility of the conflict.18 If Williams is correct, this seems a powerful argument against 
the internal harmony of the morality system. If the internal harmony of morality is 
compromised, so must the possibility of morality. If two moral demands can genuinely conflict 
all the way down, then they cannot both be completed, and it must be acknowledged that 
there are impossible demands placed on the individual by morality. Williams thereby argues 
that morality cannot be essentially practical as it claims.
! The essential practicality of morality brings with it a second pillar – what Williams 
refers to as the obligation-out obligation-in principle – the apparent moral pressure to support 
particular obligations to action with more general obligations of principle.19 In this view, 
morality presents particular obligations as mere occurrences of general obligations; and there 
is the thought that if one must fulfill an obligation in this moment, it is because all like 
individuals must fulfill this obligation in like moments. Kant aims to show that this conception 
of goodness is sensible, and points out in his opening considerations of the good will that there 
are many reasons that human beings might do one thing or another. It seems a characteristic 
of the concept of duty that it carries with it overriding or higher reasons to heed the good will. 
If one is guilty of a crime, one has incentive to deceive in the courtroom so as to avoid 
punishment; but the general duty to truthfulness should override and instruct one to remain 
truthful in the midst of counterincentives.20 A crucial role of duty might be seen here, to work 
to bind an individual to the good will so as to foster one’s moral worth; and duty does this via 
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a higher kind of reason. This is such that individuals have duties insofar as they are rational 
agents, capable of acting for reasons; and accordingly, whether an action counts as the 
performance of a duty depends on the reason for which it is done.
! In this way morality presents itself as essentially practical - a beautiful interwoven 
fabric of obligations that all rest on the harmony of its most general and universal principles. 
But this method of justification presupposes that a systematic account of morality is correct; 
and of course, Williams has rejected the essential practicality on which any such system must 
rest. There appears, though, to be another problem more specific to the obligation-out 
obligation-in principle: it is not at all obvious why one should find comfort in the backing 
general obligation if one has not already found comfort in the particular obligation. This 
position against the obligation-out obligation-in principle may be expressed by Williams’ 
phrase, “one thought too many.”21 Williams considers the situation in which one is confronted 
with the choice of saving either one’s spouse or a stranger, when both are in equal peril. It 
should be justification enough in this situation to save one’s spouse because it is one’s spouse. 
Morality, Williams thinks, demands that the individual provide an additional thought, “that in 
situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s [spouse].”22 This thought is one too many, 
and seems to convolute what the individual certainly would and should be experiencing: that 
one’s life and relationships can rightly encourage one to favor certain courses of action over 
others. The moral pressure for impartiality would not approve of this. So it seems that 
morality might not even be relevant here in a way that makes sense of human life, and if given 
jurisdiction, robs the action of its real significance.23
Saving morality! 4
! The essential practicality and flawless systematizing of morality are a part of an 
important spirit of morality, in Williams view: that it is pure in that it is immune to luck.24 The 
purity of morality takes the essential practicality of morality one step further on the level of 
possibility. Possibility states that all moral obligations are realizable by the individual they are 
placed on; purity holds that individuals are held morally responsible only for what falls under 
the umbrella of possibility.25 That is, moral responsibility applies only to the voluntary. One 
way this threatens Kantian morality is with a direct challenge to the idea that individuals are 
in a relation of freedom to the moral law. At the heart of Kant’s morality is an autonomous 
will, understood by the concept of freedom.26 At one point, Kant even claims that ethics is the 
science of the laws of freedom,27 perhaps in that freedom is the property of the will that 
characterizes its efficacy independent of external forces.28 It is a very important detail about 
Kant’s project, that he does not intend to prove the possibility of freedom. Though reason 
must be free from external causes if it is to create a will that is good in itself,29 for reason to try 
to prove its own possibility would oversteps the bounds of reason.30
! What seems more important for Kant’s morality is the relationship between freedom 
and the moral law, and this is indeed a complicated subject. There are two main points to 
bring out for the purposes here: that the moral law presupposes freedom for rational and 
conscious beings, and that the existence and workings of freedom are revealed through the 
moral law.31 When it comes to Kantian morality, it has been said that there is a general sense 
in which ought implies can.32 But for Kant, this seems to have to do less with the actual 
feasibility of a moral demand, and more with the thought that things done under compulsion 
are not free acts and therefore not lawful.33 So when freedom and morality come together, this 
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consists not so much in freedom with respect to obedience to the law (though this is indeed 
important), but rather in freedom to live under laws that are self-imposed.34 This is where 
freedom as a presupposition really surfaces, where a free will and a will under moral laws are 
one and the same.35  For a will that acts on reasons, the union of causality as freedom is 
established by the moral law.36 So freedom is a presupposition of morality for rational 
beings.37 Further, the concepts of freedom and morality are reciprocal.38 Kant seems to simply 
take for granted that human beings conceive of themselves as having free will, and therefore 
also conceive of right and wrong ways of conduct.39 Still, freedom as it is the basis of morality 
cannot be comprehended, and therefore cannot serve as the human foundation of morality.40 
For human beings, it seems it is the apprehension of the moral law that leads to the concept of 
freedom, although it is ultimately freedom that is metaphysically presupposed by the moral 
law.41
! Here we have great insight into the expression and workings of Kantian duty, that true 
freedom manifests in duty. One way that Kant begins to support his conception of duty as 
intuitive is through everyday practices - particularly those of moral esteem and censure, which 
Kant believes are done in accordance with a more common conception of duty. Two 
shopkeepers might charge the same price for their merchandise, and charge the same price to 
all customers. But suppose that one sets the price simply because it is good business, while the 
other sets the price out of honesty and fairness. Certainly, Kant supposes, while we appreciate 
and recognize the price from both businessmen, we morally esteem the latter in a way which 
we do not the former.42 The individual who acts out of duty to the moral law garners higher 
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moral esteem (or perhaps a higher kind) than the one who simply acts in conformity with the 
law.43 
! These Kantian presuppositions44 do seem crucial to morality, but Williams takes the 
plain fact of moral luck to be in direct contradiction to them45. More importantly than the 
existence of moral luck, though, is the observation that human beings are typically quite 
comfortable having the institutions of blame and regret be affected by moral luck. That is, it is 
commonplace for human beings to assign moral responsibility to the involuntary; and 
Williams asserts it is justified that we do so as human beings. Beyond even this, though, 
Williams makes a further point: that even mere skepticism about the purity of morality is 
enough to disturb the concept of moral order and law and leave in its place a less important 
concept, since “one thing that is particularly important… is how important [morality] is taken 
to be.”46 It seems that any conception of morality that does not have an answer to the issue of 
moral luck may not survive Williams’ criticisms. Much of the compelling nature of morality, 
Williams rightfully thinks, rests on the view given it as important; and any lowering of this 
importance may prove problematic for the important fourth pillar of morality: its supremacy.
! It is one thing to illustrate that ordinary human understanding of moral worth 
necessarily involves a certain notion of freedom; but it is quite another to show that such an 
understanding contains an absolutely binding principle for all rational beings. Here the 
closeness of duty and obligation47 becomes important for Kant. Obligation is, in a way, a form 
of understanding duty. Whatever an individual has a duty to do is an obligation, and vice-
versa. But Kant’s discussion of obligation deepens the concept of duty in a few ways, being 
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“the necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of reason.”48 First, an obligation 
is only truly present in actions where the ends are inexplicably and intrinsically good.49  
Second, the concept of obligation helps to make certain distinctions which the concept of duty 
alone cannot make.50 Third, obligation carries with it a notion of freedom without which it is 
necessary to conceive of human beings as subject only to the laws of nature.51 Last, the 
concept of obligation connects moral reasons to other kinds of practical concepts in a way that 
the concept of duty cannot.52 All of these amount to a notion that, in connection with reason, 
might serve to bring all human beings under a common ethics. Considering this elevated 
status given to Kant in his moral philosophy, it is understandable why Williams would aim 
some of his harshest criticisms at this notion.
! The supremacy of the moral obligation for Williams seems to include three levels. 
First, there is the idea that moral obligation is inescapable. The inescapability of moral 
obligation takes form first in the idea that the moral obligation applies even to those who see 
themselves as outside the system, and to those who do not want to be inside the system for 
whatever reason.53 Second, there is the idea that moral considerations are the most important 
kind of considerations, and therefore matters of real practical importance should be 
represented as moral obligations. The consequence here seems to be that in deliberations, 
moral considerations ought to be given more weight than amoral considerations. Third, there 
is the idea that “only an obligation can beat an obligation.”54 This is a logical consequent of the 
other factors: because the moral obligation always applies, and is always the most weighty, 
one can only be steered away from one moral obligation if one favors another moral 
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obligation. In these three ways, Williams asserts, morality tries to establish itself as the 
supreme institution by claiming its center to be this very special obligation.
! Williams challenges the supremacy of morality with his own notion of importance. 
This challenge may be wrapped up in his thought that “ethical life is itself important, but it 
can see that things other than itself are important.”55 This is ultimately grounded in a long-
held view of Williams’ that all persons have their own projects that give meaning to their own 
lives. Granted that each individual has these meaningful projects, what is important becomes 
what is needed and wanted to realize these projects.56 Out of practical necessity, one might 
either make use of or completely ignore moral obligations in projects. This seems 
commonsensical, but it has significant consequences for the supremacy of moral obligation. 
First, the brute fact that one might not comply with (or even consider) moral obligations in 
achieving one’s projects shows in some sense that the moral obligation is not, in fact, 
inescapable. Rather, it is a fact of human experience that it is constantly (and rightfully) 
escaped, because there are human projects outside of moral obligation. There is an implication 
for a second consequence here: that if moral obligations are not found most useful in 
accomplishing one’s projects, then one should not regard them as the highest kind of 
consideration. There is no point, then, in attempting to reduce one’s projects down to a set of 
obligations; rather, one’s projects can be of utmost importance and meaning without the use of 
obligation. From this, a third consequence: obligations can, do, and should, in fact, lose out to 
considerations that are not obligations. So it seems that the three crucial levels of the 
supremacy of moral obligation (and therefore of morality) are quite questionable in the face of 
the notion of importance. It is a serious question  in acknowledging these observations with 
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Williams, whether any morality - and especially one that relies heavily on obligation - could be 
truly useful to human beings. The basic incriminating thought here seems to be that the use of 
the moral obligation is ultimately grounded in something other than its own supremacy; 
rather, it relies for its implementation on another notion, of importance. If this is so, then moral 
considerations cannot themselves be the most important kind of consideration, as they rely on 
another kind of consideration for their own importance.57
! Williams’ Gaugin illustrates why we ought to be grateful that the world we must live in 
is not a place where the moral obligation reigns supreme.58 For Gaugin, that the moral 
obligation is not supreme seems to rest on the mere fact that Gaugin does not wish it were. He 
can escape moral obligations because they do not go all the way down for him, while his desire 
to devote his life to painting does. That the morality system seems to pay no regard to the 
projects of human beings is a point of much significance for Williams, and it sheds light on 
why he takes issue with the impersonality he sees in the morality system. That Kantian 
morality is impersonal (or perhaps inhuman) is one way of tying together the real crux of 
Williams’ criticisms, especially his finalizing words that morality’s errors amount to a “deeply 
rooted” and “powerful misconception of life.”59 The notion contains in it the problem of real 
irreducible moral conflict, the need for practical necessity to go all the way down, the problem 
of the one thought too many, and the problem of moral luck. For Agamemnon, to claim that 
his obligation to his daughter simply did not constitute a real moral obligation does not seem 
to capture the active deliberative struggle that he must have experienced. For the man 
encountering the simultaneous peril of his spouse and a stranger, it seems inhuman to suggest 
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that he might flip a coin or perhaps calculate survival chances in order to decide who to 
attempt to save. “The lorry driver who, through no fault of his own, runs over a child,” will 
surely be blamed as a murderer, and also feel like one;60 in these circumstances luck seems 
impossible to keep out of morality. By betraying the deep attachments to persons and 
character, it seems that morality makes nonsense out of many significant human actions, 
feelings, and deliberations.61
! At this point, one might start searching for an alternative morality that does not rely so 
heavily on obligation62, or even for an ethics that does not bother with morality at all. Kantian 
morality does not abstract from the identity of persons as Utilitarian morality does, with an 
abstraction from the separateness of persons.63 But Kantian morality does abstract from 
identity in a different way, and is thereby still impersonal. The impersonality is found in the 
drive for individuals to act according to universal standards. The notion that all individuals, 
without exception, ought to act in a certain way in certain circumstances, seems to take away 
from the importance of who performed the action, though in a different way than 
Utilitarianism. In this way Kantianism can be seen as violating Williams’ integrity objection64, 
and it is shown here how we would want a morality that pays attention to the various projects 
of individuals. Ultimately, it might seem that the meaningfulness of human life and the real 
justifications65 for human conduct have nothing to do with the impersonal standards of the 
morality system, and this is a fatal criticism for an institution that supposes itself to be guiding 
human beings through life. Indeed, human experience might run too deep and be too messy 
for the canon of moral obligation to account for; and it is becoming clearer how Kantian 
morality might overstep its proper boundaries.
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! In Williams’ view, the problem of the impersonality of morality surfaces in its reliance 
on blame and guilt. As has been pointed out, a problem with the institution of blame in 
morality is that it supposes responsibility to be attributable only to the voluntary. The 
accounts of blame, guilt, praise, regret, and other notions are all tainted by a supposed purity 
within morality. The purity of morality gives a narrowness to these notions, when perhaps a 
wider understanding of them might be more useful and true to human experience. To comfort 
Agamemnon, the husband in shipwreck, or the lorry driver via suggestions that these 
tragedies were not their fault (or perhaps not their intention), does not do justice to the 
situation - and there will probably not be much comfort found in therein. For “there is an 
authority by what one has done, and not merely by what one has intentionally done.”66 So 
there is a complication with the strange way that morality accounts for these phenomena. 
Perhaps it would not be a key fault of morality, though, if these notions (particularly blame 
and guilt) were not the characteristic reactions of the institution.67 Indeed, any institution that 
engrains such tainted notions into human beings should not be welcome in ethical life. But 
blame has to do with reasons, just as the Kantian good will does: blame in morality treats an 
individual as one who had overriding reason to do the right thing and yet did not do it.68 
There stands before the institution an individual who spits in the face of the good will. If there 
are none outside morality, then it may be correct in treating individuals accordingly. But if 
moral standards are contractual, and therefore optional in their adherence, then the moral 
obligation and the blame attributed to the individual who fails to fulfill it, will prove escapable. 
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Morality: the conversation
! It has often been said that Kantian morality is centered around the ideas of obligation 
and reason. But it is interesting that this is not where Kant begins his inquiry, nor what he 
aims it at, nor where it ends; rather, Kant’s moral philosophy begins and ends with a 
consideration of the good will.69 This is an important concept to which Kant continually 
returns throughout his practical philosophy. He starts from the postulate that the good will is 
the only thing that is limitless in its goodness, and therefore is the only thing that is 
unconditionally valued by human beings. Human beings would not sacrifice their moral 
goodness for some other object; and if the good will is the only intrinsic good, and therefore 
necessary for moral worth, then it merits highest human esteem. 
! Ultimately, it might be found that the Kantian good will is simply that will which 
deliberates on the basis of and in favor of the moral law. The good will issues only actions of 
moral esteem, because moral considerations are taken to be the highest and most conclusive of 
all considerations.70  Actions and persons, therefore, are good just in case they possess and 
heed such a will.71 To further clarify what the good will might be, Kant moves quickly to the 
concept of duty.72 Here, Kant seems far more interested in the nature of this concept - and its 
relation to the good will - than in what specific obligations might fill it out. Still, the 
significance of the notion of obligation really is an important question for all moral philosophy. 
In Kant’s working definition of obligation,73 the second component sets the parameters for 
obligations: they must be under a categorial imperative of reason. Early in the Groundwork, 
Kant supposes the purpose of reason to be to produce a will that is good in itself.74 This may 
be why the good will appeals to the concept of duty: because duty consists in necessities given 
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by reason - that is, duty provides an individual with reasons for action - which are in 
accordance with the moral law. For the good will, which is unconditionally good in itself, 
these are obligations given by reason, absolutely necessary in themselves. It is perhaps in this 
way that reason “cannot err: every force is assigned its track.”75 For in practical use, reason 
performs its deepest service not to obligations, but rather to the good will. Reason wields its 
fullest force to determine the grounds of the will, and this is its final cause.76
! Kant’s chief concern, then, is not aimed at obligation or rationality, but rather at what 
will here be called lawfulness. The formulations, including the controversial first formulation, 
result not in any specific law, but in lawfulness itself. To be sure, a morally practical law is a 
proposition that contains a categorical imperative or command.77 But the human relation to 
the moral law is one of freedom, which cannot be limited by reason.78 The moral law carries 
command only via reverence; the necessity of duty is out of reverence for law.79 Here enters 
the importance of the lawgiving form, of lawfulness: when everything is stripped away, and 
freedom is found, there is also found “the mere form of the law” to which analytically and 
linguistically driven philosophy probably cannot do justice.80 So then, morality for Kant might 
just be the spirit of the law (lawfulness) in our dispositions,81 and while this does not leave 
morality open to just any interpretation, it is certainly a much wider notion than Kant is 
normally granted via his notion of obligation.
! It should at the same time be granted, however, that Immanuel Kant is narrow-
minded. At least, his philosophical inquiry into ethics is narrow - and purposefully so. In the 
preface of his Groundwork, Kant lays out of many of the intentions, aims, and methods of his 
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project. The foundations82 a philosopher builds on, the questions that one asks, and then the 
manner in which one attempts to answer them are important before the actual answers one 
gives. When philosophers enter into a conversation with each other, these details deserve 
some attention. While many of Williams’ criticisms of Kant are astute and damaging, Williams 
seems at points to have missed the heart of morality and moral philosophy.  Any such 
disconnect may be responsible for the impotence of some of Williams’ most important 
criticisms. To retain relevance, philosophers must keep in view the questions that begin the 
inquiries, and the way in which the inquirer goes about trying to satisfy the curiosities. Kant 
asked what a pure moral philosophy might hold,83 what might be the source of practical 
laws,84 what makes a duty a duty.85 In line with his interest in lawfulness, the questions that 
captivated Kant were much more about the source, nature, and workings of morality than of 
any specific moral demands that could be derived from these things. In his conclusive 
assessment of Kantian morality, Williams discredits the philosophy chiefly as a failure to win 
the game of the Archimedean Point.86 This is the attempt to build morality “from the ground 
up,”87 to find the point of leverage into a particular moral canon for the amoralist and moralist 
alike. Williams takes it for granted that this is Kant’s project, but it is an important question 
what this game must entail, whether this is really the game Kant is playing (and if he is, how 
much so), and to what extent this is the game morality must play.
! It is safe to say that Kant is at least addressing those who agree with him on basic ideas 
of God, freedom, immortality, duty, moral law, good will, and evil. Kant admittedly does not 
attempt to prove God or immortality, deems a proof of freedom nonessential to his philosophy 
after he fails to find one, and takes notions of duty, law, good and evil to be common to all 
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reasonable human beings. And perhaps he must, if he is after a truly pure moral philosophy. 
Archimedes claimed if he were given one solid point and a long enough lever, he could lift the 
Earth. It is the same with Kant: given the foundations of God, freedom, immortality and the 
other common notions as a solid point, and perhaps reason as his lever, he claims to lift 
morality. In this way, Kant surely does not build a foundation, but perhaps finds one; he cares 
not about convincing the amoralist, but rather about explaining to the moralist. Kant does 
seem to join in the game of the Archimedean Point in his determination to remove oneself 
from the object of study, as is evident in his arrival at the idea of mere lawfulness. Whether he 
succeeds in this is questionable, but given the proper foundation and lever, his arrival at mere 
lawfulness seems promising.
! Perhaps Kant buys in to the game of the Archimedean Point, but certainly not in some 
of the ways that are often most attacked and criticized. His foundation is discovered rather 
than built, and this provides an alternative conception of objective leveraging: as a mere entry 
point. This raises questions about how damaging Williams’ criticisms of morality really are, 
and how easily he can cast aside this supposedly obsolete variety of ethics. To Williams’ own 
admission, “morality is not an invention of philosophers.”88 If the parts of Kant that really are 
essential to morality suffer devastating blows from Williams, then morality seems beyond 
saving. Even here, the death of morality relies on the death of some very important notions 
which the survival of ethics might rely on. If, on the other hand, Williams seems to have 
misfired so as to leave these essential parts unscathed, morality seems still beyond our saving - 
but that will be either because what is in no danger requires no salvation, or human beings 
shall not prove capable of such salvation.
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Re-viewing morality, a simple institution
! I hope that I have aroused some suspicion that the Kant-Williams debate might be less 
straightforward than one is initially encouraged to believe. There is also the suspicion that 
some parts of this debate might not be so much a debate, but more like two closely related 
monologues. The Kant-Williams debate, to be of real importance, must of course run deeper 
than one philosopher’s critique of another philosopher’s thoughts. The questions here are, as 
Williams states, not trivial, as we are talking about how human beings should live89; and we 
are talking about the place that the institution of morality should have in human life and in the 
ethical discourse that concerns it. This chapter aims to take another look at the morality that 
both Kant and Williams conceive, and also provide an alternative conception of morality that 
might not fall prey to Williams’ criticisms but also remain recognizable. That view will hold 
that morality, as an introduction to ethics, is a simple institution which rests on a few simple 
notions that invite many complexities into human life. So far what is involved in this 
conception of morality as an introduction is just that morality provides a leveraging into ethics 
in that it provides the point of entry. Kant may, in this view, set up morality to be too far-
reaching into ethics, while Williams cuts off its reach far too early. Both of these result in 
certain perversions of morality that make it unhelpful to human beings in their ethical lives.
What is morality really about?
! Part of what will help to settle the Kant-Williams debate might be different set of 
lenses through which to view the issues that they discuss. This section will present three  in 
particular: whether the moral law is compatible with what will here be called “moral loss,” 
whether the moral law can in abstraction from human beings overcome the difficulties 
presented by moral loss, and how human beings can make sense of these tensions. These 
notions are taken to be basic and easily apprehensible, and as such give morality much of its 
positioning as an introduction to ethics. The questions raised herein concern relationships, 
and the challenges to integrity that are posed in each relationship - between moral law and 
moral loss, between the moral law and itself (in letter and spirit), and between the moral law 
and human beings. These questions are in many ways related to the six pillars of morality 
identified and critiqued by Williams. It will finally be suggested that morality introduces 
human beings to a notion which Williams himself develops (although not enough), called 
“conviction,” and that this notion can help point toward some responses to these challenges.
! First must be addressed a primary distinction of this work, concerning a significant 
divergence from Kant. It was hinted at in the previous chapter that, in light of Kant’s 
conception of the good will, morality might really be mere lawfulness. So an inquiry into the 
nature of the moral law seems necessary to see if Williams’ criticisms against morality are 
good. At the beginning of the “Doctrine of Method,” there is a statement containing two 
contrasting ideas for Kant’s moral philosophy: “The letter of the law (legality) would be found 
in our actions, but the spirit of it in our dispositions (morality) would not be found at all.”90 
Here we might find Kant’s brief answer to what morality is really about. While this work 
acknowledges and in many ways agrees with Kant’s distinction, it will develop throughout this 
chapter its own distinction between the letter and spirit of the law. It makes an additional 
separation in the moral law which Kant does not, between the utterable maxims of the law 
and the immaterial spirit of it. The issues of codification, conformity, self-legislation and 
conviction are at play here; and it is a question of this section whether Kant or Williams has 
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proper understanding of these ways in which the moral law works. In an early consideration 
of moral loss, the question was raised unaddressed, whether moral luck compromises any 
sensible notion of moral law (or ethical ideal, for that matter). There will here be an attempt to 
show that a proper distinction between the letter and spirit of the law provides a not only an 
answer to moral loss, but a compatible framework for incorporating it into ethical life.
Moral luck or moral loss?
! It is at this point necessary for foundation to involve a wider discussion of the nature of 
the moral law and the human condition in relation. Human beings hold two battling sets of 
basic intuitions. The first91 are concerning how things ought to be, and the subsequent 
intuitions concerning what might be called decent behavior. These intuitions, at their weakest, 
are preferences. At their strongest, they are more than preferences; indeed, we often times 
suppose them to be absolute standards, both internally and externally, individually and 
communally.92 What is more, we feel at times that these moral absolutes are thrust upon us, 
both from the inside and the outside, and we have a sense that this is the case for other human 
beings as well. Two persons quarreling about a place in line93 have no business quarreling 
unless they share some intuitions about right and wrong order. The man who says, “I was here 
first,” it not just saying that the other person’s behavior merely does not happen to please him. 
He is appealing to some standard of decent behavior that he assumes is shared. The other 
person will seldom reply, “I do not care about your standard;” and if he does, it is not likely to 
be found a morally reasonable response. Rather, the other person will likely try to justify his 
position in line, explaining either why his actions do not really go against the standard, or that 
he somehow deserves to be an exception (perhaps he is in a hurry) to the standard. Without 
Saving morality! 20
these intuitions of moral standard, human beings perhaps could fight like savages, but they 
would never reach what we consider a humane level of quarreling.
! The second set of intuitions suggests that the world is in a state of what will here be 
called moral loss -  it is part of the nature of the world and human beings which makes the 
human relation to the moral law difficult. Human beings are surrounded by and participate in 
circumstances that fall far short of their ideals. Few are the times when human beings look 
around the world and feel that all is as it should be; and this seems to be the fault of no 
particular person or circumstance, but rather a metaphysical fact about the world. Human 
beings often find themselves in situations that are simply bad; and what is more, they also 
often find themselves compelled to act in ways that contradict their moral ideals. The one 
confronted at home by an armed robber does not seem to have a morally acceptable choice 
available, for he will either let harm be done to his family or do harm to the intruder. The man 
in a hurry at the store agrees with moral intuitions concerning order, but in his rush feels 
compelled to disregard them. This is the torn canvas on which our ideas of the moral law are 
painted: the ideal of moral perfection is not fulfilled in the reality of moral loss. Our intuitions 
about the moral law represent an ideal that we are (at least sometimes) aware constantly goes 
unmet. It is a real question whether the reality of moral loss compromises the ideal of moral 
perfection. The moral law is a fit tool for governing a perfect world, but it is unclear that it 
should reign supreme for human beings, who might find other things more important. Out of 
these two sets of simple intuitions arise implications for Williams’ concepts of moral conflicts, 
moral luck and the supremacy of morality.
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! There is an acknowledgment of irreducible moral conflict in the concept of moral loss 
that is, in a way, quite straightforward. To see that the world and the people in it are under the 
condition of moral loss includes an admission that there are situations in which, as Williams 
describes, there is no better thing to be done. The reality of moral loss in some ways might just 
be the recognition of ubiquitous moral conflict. But what is important here is that the moral 
law is not blind to this reality, and in fact the moral law (and the human condition of being 
under it) often times is the very thing that informs human beings of this reality. There are 
many points to be drawn out from this observation, but I will here address only two. They 
both rely on the positioning of morality as an introduction to ethics. The first has to do with 
moral worth. If moral loss is true, then in every ethical situation, for every human being the 
point of entry is in some sense a handicapped one. The man confronted by the armed robber 
does not enter his quandary on level ground; on the contrary, the ethical game board is tilted 
against him from the start. But if morality is an introduction to ethics, then it is not clear that 
making morally praiseworthy94 choices is ultimately what ethical beings aim for, though they 
may begin there. To claim that this man makes a morally unpraiseworthy choice, then, is 
simply to say that he has not improved the status quo; and this is quite different from 
suggesting that this man comes out of the conflict with an ethically worse character than he 
entered it.
! The man facing the armed robber has been confronted with, victimized by and a 
participant in the condition of moral loss. That the moral law does not govern ignorant of such 
realities brings up a second point that is something of a reiteration of the initial observation 
itself. The moral law recognizes as it must the fact of moral conflict, but this is not to say that it 
recognizes a problem which it subsequently seeks to eliminate or mitigate. If the moral law is 
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indeed an ethical ideal of practice, it would be a perversion to suppose that the moral law is 
naive (or arrogant) enough to aim to change the fundamental facts of the world. Rather, the 
notions of moral law and moral loss serve as compliments to each other in their being attended 
to by human beings, and their relationship is nothing much more substantial than this. An 
awareness of the ubiquitousness of moral loss should lead to an awareness of a similar nature 
in the moral law, and vice versa. Moral loss certainly is problematic for the world and the 
human beings in it, but that does not necessitate that it is likewise problematic for the integrity 
of the moral law that seeks to govern the world.
! Of course, the fact of irreducible moral conflict is not the only serious threat to the 
purity of morality pointed out by Williams. There is also the fact of moral luck.  While it is 
worth pointing out that Williams does not provide much argumentation for the truth of moral 
luck, it is not necessary here to debate its existence, as a much more interesting picture of 
moral loss is painted if moral luck is granted. Moral conflicts challenge the essential 
practicality of morality on the level of possibility, but moral luck challenges the purity of 
morality on the level of responsibility. One understanding of morality - if Kant suggested that 
the aspect of real importance is the motive behind moral action - is to view the moral law as 
only applicable to the voluntary. But this gets the scope of morality as an introduction wrong; 
if moral loss is true, this understanding of morality95 may be too narrow. If moral loss is 
something of a universal constant, then so is the moral law. The issues of voluntarism and free 
agency raise difficulties in questioning how it is possible for the moral law to uphold 
simultaneously its standards of justice and holiness, and all the while demanding that it must 
remain relevant to human life. If it is really the moral law that is held in view, then by 
definition none of these can be sacrificed; but it seems to be questioned on the issue of moral 
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luck why the moral law does not make exceptions, especially to its standard of holiness. From 
the perspective of the moral law, a transgression by whatever means and to whatever end, 
must be counted as a transgression96, and that is a plain fact. Though he may be pardoned, the 
lorry driver who runs over a child will be charged under the law prohibiting the killing of 
human beings, irrespective of the correctness of his driving or the child’s behavior. Legal 
occurrences such as these are not strange, and they are similarly not alien or unmanageable 
for the moral law. They are rather made quite familiar via the relationship that the moral law 
has with moral loss. A consequence of this fact is that the moral law can and must exercise 
equal jurisdiction in the arenas of the voluntary and involuntary; and a conclusion here is that 
any supposed presence of luck does not necessarily carry with it the absence of morality.
! The issue of voluntarism aside, there is something of greater interest here that has to 
do with the usefulness of the respective philosophical notions in question.  We often seem 
eager to invoke the notion of luck only in situations of tragedy; but our intuitions of moral loss 
are familiar, and their occurrences ordinary. Most ethical quandaries, as humans register, are 
not tragedies in the typical sense: good and services are overpriced, two people exchange 
indecent words, a jealous neighbor carries malice in his heart. While issues of moral luck seem 
to involve a suggestion that there was no good moral reason for things to happen as they did, 
intuitions of moral loss can help the moral law speak into issues that are not often thought of 
as having to do with reasons at all. It has just been shown that morality must be more apt to 
speak to issues of the involuntary than is often accredited; and now it is seen that morality, via 
the relationship between law and loss, is able to speak into the ordinary - a realm where the 
notion of luck does not much aid the human navigation of ethical situations. Morality, as an 
introduction, here shows this: that though there is certainly “no need of irrational gods, to give 
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rise to tragic situations,”97 there is no greater need of tragic situations to give rise to ethical 
significance. If ethics is searching for a lens through which to make sense of human life, the 
notion of moral loss may have a much richer ability than moral luck.
! Perhaps the accusations that morality claims for itself an unmerited practicality and 
purity are not quite as well founded as was originally supposed. There is still recourse, 
though, to the thoughts that for Williams the most important pillar to weaken is the pillar of 
supremacy: morality’s claim to absolute deliberative priority for human beings because it has 
as its center the very privileged moral obligation. The privileged status of Kant’s moral 
obligation, according to Williams, rests on contentious ideas of inescapability, importance, and 
hierarchy. More work is required before the issue of supremacy can be faced head on, but 
there are a few points that can begin to color the discussion given this discourse on morality, 
law and loss. The fact that the moral law holds in full view the condition of moral loss 
indicates that the position of self-proclaimed supremacy by the moral law is perhaps a bit 
more sobered than usually supposed. The moral law is not a delusion but rather an ideal, and 
it is not surprised when it is escaped, disordered, and demoted by human beings. For the 
moral law, in light of moral loss, must be prepared for its reign to not always be revered by 
human beings as supreme. Morality, as an introduction, will have definitive words on many 
ethical issues, but few of them will be final. Plainly, if the law/loss relationship is truly integral 
to morality, and shows that morality is an introductory institution, then the criticism of the 
supremacy of morality will have to rely on something more than a false supposition that 
morality gives no consideration to matters of human importance outside its own law.
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The moral law: letter and spirit
! The question remains how the two conditions of moral loss and moral law can 
workably be reconciled for human beings. It seems that the moral law should be in constant 
conflict with the reality moral loss, which indeed is a kind of law in its own right. Behind both 
of these notions then is a conception of law, which is itself a notion of great importance to 
Kant.98 Of particular interest here should be the internal consistency of the concept of law in 
morality, and of particular aid here will be not the distinction that Kant makes between the 
letter and spirit of the moral law, but an alternative one which has already begun its 
development in this work. To see whether internal harmony of the moral law is possible and 
present - especially given the notion of moral loss - the issues of codification, conformity, self-
legislation, and conviction will be addressed. The issues will be used to explain the letter/spirit 
distinction, and this distinction will illustrate some implications for the place of morality as an 
introduction to ethics.
! Williams approaches the moral law as any other codification, as an essentially practical 
set of supreme general principles developing into increasingly specific (yet universal) rules. As 
far as the letter of the law, it does seem to be the case that the moral law cannot be truly 
humanly practical. The moral demands in letter do at times conflict irreducibly in practice; 
and there are also circumstances that lead one to feel that the letter of the law must be 
transgressed. The one who answers the door to find Kant’s murderer is faced with a host of 
moral quandaries as far as legality is concerned. But if the moral law is to be treated as a 
codification - which seems appropriate on the level of the letter - then it must be remembered 
that as a human codification, it is as much of a failure as any other human institution.99 Given 
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the notion of moral loss, one might wonder whether that is a problem of the law, or a fact 
about the world in which the law is implemented. If morality is indeed about standards of 
behavior, and the letter of the law therein representative of the ideal of moral perfection, then 
it might seem a mistake to find the law invalid on grounds that its letter goes unfulfilled in a 
world of moral loss. This is buttressed by the distinction of letter and spirit, in that the moral 
law is not wholly captured for human beings by the letter. Every codification brings along 
with it a spirit which the letter attempts to express. Morality is no different, and the spirit of 
the law is able to fill in many of the parts of morality that are left unsatisfied by the letter.100 If 
the whole story of the moral law were one of letter, then it would be nonsensical of Kant to 
even conceive of the moral law as being “within me.”101 But there is a further point, that 
morality, as an introduction, should not be expected to provide the full story of ethics.
! So it is not clear that to compromise in abstraction the legality of the law is also to 
compromise the morality of the law, and this works itself out in practical application on the 
issue of conformity. That the man confronted with the murderer at his door cannot conform to 
the letter of the law in actions does not necessitate that he also cannot agree with the spirit of 
the law in dispositions.102 If the moral law is indeed a representation of the moral ideal of 
perfection, then any lack of conformity to the letter will indeed be troubling as Williams 
supposes; moral loss does not absolve human beings from their duty to the letter of the law. 
However, it is important to give morality the proper scope and flexibility due to it: situations 
of conflict on the legal level can actually provide great opportunities to adhere to and embody 
the spirit of the law; and also that situations of harmony on the level of legality can be 
transgressions of the spirit of the law. So it seems that, if to be understood properly as a 
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codification which primarily introduces broader ethical ideals, the letter of the moral law must 
be taken comprehensively and systematically to point toward a certain spirit of the law.103
! It is not taken lightly that this presents great difficulties when it comes to moral self-
legislation, the arena in which these complexities concerning codification and conformity must 
work themselves out, or perhaps be worked out by the people who face them. Two things, 
autonomy and lawfulness, seem necessary for self-legislation in Kant’s view: one must legislate 
out of a relation of freedom to the moral law, and the legislation must have the form of law. 
There is a notion of conviction104 that may be of help in understanding how one can self-
legislate in a world of moral loss given the distinction between letter and spirit. We discussed 
earlier intuitions of decent behavior, ranging from preferences to absolutes. This is one crucial 
way that morality introduces human beings to ethical life, that its problems demand the 
development of ethical conviction. Conviction might be considered the mechanism for 
mediation between these two, as it helps in the moment of deliberation to decide what 
preferences are allowed to fall by the wayside, and which absolutes must not be forfeited. 
Likewise conviction helps to mediate between the pull to conform to the letter of the law and 
the sometimes conflicting pull to follow the spirit of the law. Conviction carries with it the 
resolve of confidence needed to act, and also the full assurance needed to live with the 
consequences of the action. It is the force of the soul that informs what one is willing to live 
and die for, and a proper view of morality is crucial to a proper understanding of this notion 
which is perhaps the most important in all of ethics.
~
Saving morality! 28
! If morality is just an introduction, it might be wondered whether the basic notions of 
moral loss and the letter/spirit distinction truly can lead to such a lofty concept as conviction, 
that which ethical life is built around and ethical virtue depends upon. My essential 
suggestions thus far are these: that morality is a subject of frequent and intense conversations 
such as the Kant/Williams discourse, that there is a depth to the moral law that it is often not 
granted in these conversations,105 and that proper attention to this depth might lead to a better 
understanding of the nature of ethics. Additionally, there is the suggestion (but not yet any 
real argument) that all of this is properly held in view by a conception of morality as an 
introduction to ethics.
! Under this conception, the notions of moral loss and the letter/spirit distinction tried to 
provide a few insights about moral luck. First, that a situation seems to involve fortune does 
not rule out the involvement of morality in the situation, since in many ways morality is what 
framed the situation as an ethical quandary. The relationship between the moral law and 
moral loss shows that morality has jurisdiction in issues of both the voluntary and the 
involuntary; so though not perhaps in the way that Kant assumed, morality seems quite 
inescapable. This leads to a second insight, that the influence of moral luck is in many 
situations questionable. If a defining characteristic of moral luck is the absence of morality’s 
authority, and yet morality retains jurisdiction even in the involuntary, then it needs to be 
shown how situations of the involuntary are to be seen as affected by luck (and not merely 
loss). In any case, more than the notion of luck is necessary to keep morality out of human life 
altogether, and that illustrates a third insight here. The relationship between law and loss gives 
morality a point of entry into an area of human life which luck does not: the ordinary; and the 
letter/spirit distinction brings to ethics a mechanism suitable for navigating both the typical 
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and tragic quandaries alike: conviction. Morality seems capable of going farther - to both the 
surface and the depths - to make sense of human life than was initially supposed.
! The notions of moral loss and the letter/spirit distinction also tried to provide a few 
insights about moral conflicts. The first is that if moral conflicts are a threat to the integrity 
and usefulness of the moral law, it is not because the moral law is ignorant of, blind to, 
surprised by, removed from, or hostile toward the occurrences of moral conflict in the human 
ethical life. Indeed for human beings, the moral law starts from the fact of moral loss (and vice 
versa), and it is often the moral law itself that informs of moral conflict. Rigidity in moral 
standards on the part of the letter of the law does not come without the interpretive flexibility 
on the part of the spirit of the law; and that morality is equipped with both gives it an integrity 
and authority to speak to and navigate through situations of moral conflict. There need be, 
then, no single elaborate letter of the law that unfolds with increasing specificity to deliver 
moral commands right down to the very moments one finds oneself in. An introduction would 
not reasonably be expected to provide such elaboration. Morality can, with Williams, reject 
the obligation-out obligation-in principle, and that is a second insight here. An overall 
conception of morality should find the spirit of the law rich enough that the letter of the law 
need not overstep its proper bounds. Indeed, both levels of morality have their proper place, 
which leads to a the third insight: different moral conflicts apply to morality in different ways. 
A moral conflict on the level of the letter does not necessitate a conflict on the level of the 
spirit, and vice versa. The force of conviction is capable of deflecting and absorbing the blows 
of moral conflicts (even ones caused by luck) to see that the legitimacy of the moral law as a 
practical institution is not compromised; and this can mean identifying apparent moral 
conflicts as only superficial,106 and delegating to which level (letter or spirit) the conflict truly 
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applies.107 There will be the suspicion that this all seems a bit messy, but indeed, that is just 
what is shown: that an introductory institution be essentially practical should not bar it from 
being messy.
Morality, and other things
! The intricacies that morality invites into human life are immeasurable. It has been 
suggested that, as an introduction to ethics, morality is about much more than rules. It is about 
the human struggle to navigate, through conviction, these two tensions between the moral law 
and moral loss, and also the letter of the law and the spirit of it. Yet morality is still, after all 
this, a simple institution, as an introduction must be. The essence of morality requires only 
this, that there is a letter of the moral law aiming to apprehend and represent the spirit of the 
moral law. This should be found in some ways not far off from Kant’s morality, the essence of 
which is just lawfulness aimed at the possession of the good will. I hope the relationships of 
law and loss, and letter and spirit, have helped to safeguard against any philosophical 
perversion of the subject. For though these claims should be straightforward and 
uncontroversial, it seems that many philosophers would seek to add to, subtract from or 
transform morality into some other thing than it really is, hoping either to prop it up or tear it 
down. It is implied here that in his account of morality, Kant provides a very good, but 
insufficient, introduction to ethics by stretching obligation and reason too far; but Williams in 
some ways allows morality too far a reach by stretching notions such as blame and guilt too 
far. Both of these approaches will land morality equally disqualified as an institution that 
should aid human beings in ethical life. The especially relevant contaminations of morality 
here are the overvaluing  of the importance of reason and obligation in morality, and the 
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perceived obsession with blame and guilt in morality. This section will argue that these 
confusions are a result of inadequate attention to the law/loss and letter/spirit relationships, 
and that ethical conviction as framed by morality provides a useful framework for why and 
how these issues pervert conceptions of morality.
Impartiality, impersonality and what morality values
! It was pointed out in the first chapter that many suppose Kantian morality to be mostly 
centered and resting on the ideas of obligation and reason. It was shortly after pointed out 
that the foundations for Kant’s moral philosophy (to his own admission) in fact center around, 
begin and end with a consideration of the good will. Though obligation and reason have their 
place of importance easily given by all of the discussion of the categorical imperative, one 
might take Kant’s admission of the primacy of the good will to be sufficient for not supposing 
that obligation and reason hold such the fundamental position in his moral philosophy, 
especially when he supposed the purpose of obligation and reason to be the production of the 
good will.108 So obligation and reason, in Kant’s view, are neither the beginning, end, nor core 
of morality, and that should be a reasonable position, unless Kant’s whole philosophy is to be 
put up for interpretive grabs.109 But in case it is not found reasonable enough for morality in 
general, perhaps the earlier developed letter/spirit distinction could be of help in determining 
the place of obligation and reason. Recall that one letter/spirit distinction was introduced by 
Kant as a caveat to his position that “moral worth... must be represented as proper incentives 
to action.”110 It is obligation and reason that inform these incentives and thus aim at the good 
will, which is in this work being likened to the spirit of the law (though not the spirit that 
Kant discussed). If the additional distinction here is found reasonable, then obligation and 
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reason may be found to inform primarily the letter of the law. But even on Kant’s account, 
conformity to the letter of the moral law will not by itself do, as the letter without the spirit 
turns out to be “sheer hypocrisy” and even hatred of the moral law.111 An implication here is 
that obligation and reason are themselves good only insofar as they help to produce the spirit 
of the law.112 So it seems that any critique of the whole of morality that centers around 
obligation and reason has likely either overvalued the letter of the law, undervalued the spirit 
of it, or not adequately attended to the relation between the two in the determination of moral 
worth. All three are grave misunderstandings of the institution of morality.
! It was suggested earlier that morality need not accept Williams’ obligation-out 
obligation-in principle, based on a somewhat loose idea that the spirit of the law can make up 
for in conviction what the letter of the law might lack in order. Having the fuller discourse of 
the letter/spirit and law/loss distinctions in view provides the positioning to more fully explore 
that idea. It has to do with another earlier claim that morality is ultimately a simple institution, 
which consists essentially in a letter of the law that advocates for the spirit of the law. It also 
grants a certain understanding of moral loss. When moral conflicts - which may be nothing 
more than particular expressions of the fundamental condition of moral loss - confront human 
beings, the moral demand is to favor the spirit of the law, just as in any other situation, as 
moral loss is always present. If there is a letter to the law that should help follow the spirit, 
then the letter should certainly be followed. If there is not, it is not unreasonable to think that 
the spirit of the law can, within the human heart (the dwelling of the moral law), amend the 
letter to appropriate the situation.113 The husband confronted by the situations of conflicting 
peril114 has no more complicated a moral demand upon him than to favor the spirit of the law; 
and this is not without regard to, but may be without conformity to, what the law should 
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dictate to him in letter. The ethical vulnerability here then might not be a propensity for one 
thought too many, but rather one thought too few.115
! There is another way that morality can be misused, but the weight of 
misunderstanding rests more on moral loss. It relates to the perceived (or perhaps projected) 
obsession with blame and guilt within morality. There was an attempt earlier to conjure a 
universal intuition of moral loss, and involved in this was the thought that no particular 
person or circumstance is alone responsible for the condition of moral loss.116 One common 
view (held by Williams) believes that blame is attributed in the morality system to one who 
does not do something that one had a reason - perhaps an overriding reason - to do.117 There 
are at least three reasons why this account of blame cannot be identified with morality, two of 
which can be dealt with at this point.118 The first is involves a lack of appreciation for the law/
loss relationship. If moral loss is true, then the moral law stands the only entity of perfection 
in the moral realm, and therefore the only entity with a legitimate right to blame. But blame 
(and also guilt) is a strictly human phenomenon, while the moral law convicts of loss to steer 
toward the spirit of the law. That human beings might twist the moral law to their own 
purposes should not be a problem with the law, but with the human beings who abuse it. The 
second point is related, that the institution of blame often serves as a form of coercion for 
human beings to conform with the law. This conformity is usually to the letter of the law, and 
it should be at this point clear that mere conformity to the letter of the law is insufficient for 
moral worth. But there is an additional point here, that if the moral law did incorporate blame, 
it would be inconsistent with its fundamental aims to use blame (or guilt) as is usually 
suggested. For moral agents can be under no compulsion - other than a pure pull toward the 
good will - to attain moral worth. So it seems that any view of morality that observes blame 
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and guilt to be its characteristic reactions might need to explain how it is morality that is held 
in view.
! What these confusions amount to is an application of certain moral values where they 
do not belong, in order to suggest a particular brand of impartiality and impersonality in 
morality that may not be ultimately present. Morality, as an introduction to ethics, will try to 
pull individuals into ethics with first impressions, but it will never present the whole body of 
ethics to anyone. To be sure, the moral law must be impartial - especially in letter. A 
transgression is a transgression, and a partial violation of the law is a violation of its whole 
body, regardless of persons, characters or circumstances. But this does not mean that the law 
in spirit is restricted from empathy and familiarity with the human condition; indeed, any view 
of morality that holds it to such a restriction has likely not given adequate attention the extent 
of the paradoxically full and simultaneous presence of both the moral law and moral loss in 
human life. Morality must be impersonal in its demand on individuals to desire with their 
whole souls - relationships and the attachments therein included - the good will. Those who 
are repulsed with moral blame are right in their opposition, but they often illuminate that the 
real problem with blame between moral agents is that it grossly distorts the moral value of 
human trust - a relational dynamic that involves the full-blown spectrum of human life -  and 
that this might be the reason that the letter of the law makes certain prohibitions such as lying. 
Ironically, such reductions end up presenting morality as being much less burdensome than it 
might be found if its full weight was granted. For, granted the reality of moral loss and the 
difficulty of attaining the letter of the law, part of the place that morality holds in human 
ethical life is just this: to demonstrate that the admirable moral agent must be quite remote 
from the ordinary conception of the decent human being,119 and to challenge any ethical view 
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that tries to bridge that gap with ease. Rather, it requires the discipline of developing ethical 
conviction, a discipline which morality teaches.
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Ethical conviction and what must save morality
! A large part of what has been put under investigation thus far is the proper place of 
morality in ethics and human life. It is a point of this work that problems of the self should be 
addressed as just that, and these problems are not necessarily problems for any institution that 
the self relates to, including morality. But problems for morality, on the other hand, certainly 
are problems for human beings, and this chapter will try to show how human beings can live 
with morality granted that they must. Problems for morality, as an introduction, are also 
problems for ethics itself, and this suggestion from the first chapter will be solidified in this 
chapter. For all of the problems and complications that this simple institution brings with it, it 
also brings solutions - or at least responses - to many of these. It will be the final suggestion of 
this work that morality may, after all, be the entry point to ethics for human beings.
An ethics without morality
! Up to this point there have not been many suggestions about proper ethical 
philosophy, as the scope has been limited to morality proper. Where the end of the first 
chapter anticipated whether Williams would deal fatal blows to morality, it was hinted at that 
such a death might include notions essentials to ethics. Ultimately, it might be seen that what 
these notions hinge on is conviction, a notion Williams rightly esteems as central to human 
ethical life. He supposes that in the absence of morality, his notions of confidence and 
importance120 adequately support the notion of ethical conviction. But without the law/loss 
and letter/spirit relations, notions  that live quite close to conviction - especially ethical truth - 
may be lost. In fact, without these, it might be difficult to hold up any real notion of ethical 
conviction at all; and without any substantive notion of conviction, it is unclear what sort of 
ethics survives.
! Williams’ discussion of confidence comes in a wider discussion of the failed quest for an 
objective ethics, in order to rescue to core of ethical conviction from the particular failures of 
reflection and ethical knowledge.121 If there is no objective way to settle ethical differences, 
Williams says, relativism might seem the appropriate response; and where relativism fails, one 
might expect reflection to succeed. But ultimately these will not do, and to navigate real 
ethical quandaries, “we need a third conception... confidence.”122 Williams supposes that 
confidence can without coercion restore ethical conviction from its lack, and it can do this as 
“merely one good among others.”123 But this attitude does not retain the sort of truth that we 
usually suppose goes into ethical conviction. Moral loss is a condition that holds all human 
beings ethically handicapped, and the moral law reveals the ethical standards that they - 
despite their handicap - aspire to (and, in letter, reveals the set of standards that they could 
not possibly fulfill). It was supposed in the last chapter that conviction should be the force 
that serves to navigate this tricky state that human beings find themselves in. Surely what is 
desired in situations of moral conflict - what the husband desires124 - is more than the 
certainty that an action is permissible, but also more than a mere option that he can be 
confident in. The desire is for some notion of redemption from moral loss, some reconciliation 
with the moral law; and while confidence is an important ingredient for ethical conviction, it 
provides little help in pointing toward what it is that human beings should have conviction 
in.125
! That is supposed to be helped by Williams’ notion of importance, but this notion is 
poorly understood126 - and bound to be so - and that is a real problem. As was discussed in the 
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first chapter, Williams wants to use this notion primarily to show that obligation is merely one 
method of ethical deliberation, and also that it is a poor one.127 The fundamental convolution 
is whether importance is supposed to be understood as a measure or a judge. Importance as a 
measure would be a value, which different projects have differing amounts of (or even kinds) 
for different human beings. Here the role of importance with respect to projects might be 
analogous to the role of money with respect to materials. Importance as a judge, in contrast, 
would be the deliberative mechanism itself that decides which project to follow - which 
material to purchase. Williams’ notion convolutes these two, and the result is the appearance 
that importance can actually be both measure and judge. Importance is supposed to both 
distinguish between matters of relative and simple importance, and also the view through which 
deliberative priority is assigned.128 There is a straightforward explanation of why this will not 
by itself be useful to human ethical life, and it is twofold. 
! Williams’ view of (especially Kantian) morality sees obligation being given (among 
other functions) the commensurable measure of moral worth: all moral agents and their 
actions can be weighed by the extent to which they fulfill their obligations. If importance is to 
be the commensurable measure through which projects are prioritized, then it cannot also be 
the mechanism that distinguishes kinds of projects. Money can put two items under the same 
measure of value, but it will not inform that one item is a good and one item is a service. The 
second part is that if, on the other hand, importance is the mechanism that distinguishes 
between types, then it will be of no help in deciding which projects are more important. If 
money distinguished between kinds of materials - say, cheap and expensive - it still could not 
explain why one kind should be preferred to the other. The intuition that tells a human being 
to favor simple importances over relative importances cannot itself be importance. Ultimately, 
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importance will run into the same problem that Williams believes morality has - it cannot with 
integrity delegate its own importance in ethical deliberation. Morality does not need to 
encounter the problems of importance that Williams supposes, because as an introduction it 
simply points toward (rather than decides) what is ethically important. The commensurability 
of morality in ethical values requires only this, that all parts of ethics will have in common that 
human beings arrived at them through morality.
! So there should be some doubt whether Williams’ own notions are sufficient to keep 
ethics afloat in the absence of morality. This should be found true especially in practice, that at 
least part of the reason that morality has long played such an integral part in ethical 
philosophy is because it is integral to the human experience. It will here be argued that this is 
necessarily so. This can be supported by the expression of the moral law in the form of 
common sense, the human desire for rules and reasons, and the need for human beings to lead 
communal lives. Williams admits that morality is deeply rooted in human beings,129 and the 
Kantian position is that this is because the moral law is an innate for human beings. It is an 
important feature of morality being an introduction to ethics that the moral law is wired in 
whether or not any specific ethic is. Any position that wants to toss morality out will need to 
show how morality is nonessential to humanity in such a way that permits its disposal.
! Many of the points here have already been made, though independently, throughout 
this work. In the discussion of the law/loss relationship, it was suggested that human beings 
have basic ideas of right and wrong behavior, and rules that should accompany these ideas. It 
does not matter that the content of many of these notions is societally manufactured. For 
though societal pressures could develop endless specific rules of decent human conduct, it is 
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less likely that one could be societally persuaded to buy in to the rule-giving form itself. One 
may be convinced to follow specific rules, but it is unclear how one would be convinced on a 
deep level that rules are what should be followed.130 Yet human beings do deeply desire both 
rules and reasons for both their own and others’ behavior; and even the great lengths that 
human beings will go to in order to excuse themselves from the specific rules illustrate how 
deeply they believe in rules as an institution. The Kantian intuition that morality is completely 
derived from and governed by reason, though an insufficient picture of morality and ethics,131 
is not a bad one, and it explains much of the fundamental human ethical life, especially its 
beginnings.
! After all, it still seems a fair claim that the moral law, as Kant supposed, is simply built 
into human nature. It is doubtful that any philosophy could ultimately disprove (in the strict 
sense) this Kantian intuition, but that is not the real point. Early on in his own philosophy, 
Williams supposes ethics to be about finding one’s “deepest impulse” and following it,132 and it 
is seen in his somewhat final judgment of morality that the notions of confidence and importance 
are the primary notions useful in this journey. While Kant is often criticized for presenting a 
cold decision machine for an ethical theory,133 it is unclear that Williams’ own notions of 
confidence and importance do not combine to create their own sort of decision machine for 
favoring this “deepest impulse.” But granted this is not a decision machine of its own kind, 
Williams’ ethical foundations have the danger of leading to a philosophy that everything is 
ultimately permitted; and it becomes unclear in that case what need one would have for the 
sanction of truth in feeling that “there is something that is your deepest impulse.”134 If there is 
not first reason for believing that there should be some specific content of ethical convictions, 
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then it is unlikely that any certainty about one’s deepest impulse is going to be found more 
compelling than ethical knowledge or even Kant’s moral obligation.
! This view of ethics seems to leave out at least two of the basic truths about human life 
that morality holds in full view, and that are necessary for legitimate ethical conviction. The 
first is that often times, the deepest impulses of human beings are bad. An ethics that starts 
from the law/loss relationship of morality will not lose sight of this, and prove useful in ways 
which an ethics without morality could never hope for. Williams supposes that ethics, perhaps 
through importance, should try to see around the “intimidating structure that morality has 
made.”135 But this supposedly widened vision  ignores a second truth about human life, that 
often times our moral impulses are the deepest ones. As an introduction to ethics, morality 
does not need to contain all of our deepest impulses, but it must carry some of them. In 
developing practical confidence, it seems then that an ethical conviction that eliminates 
morality would have to be self-deceptive on some deep level; and it is not clear why we should 
be encouraged to make the trade to this form of self-deception over that which is allegedly 
found in morality.136 For ethical conviction is at its core about integrity, and this can disagree 
with practical confidence itself. It seems that morality, on this account, is thrown out not for a 
grave misunderstanding of human life,137 but rather because it impresses on human beings 
certain notions about ethical life that it understands too well, and because it is too committed to 
answering finally some of the basic questions138 of life. What is still left for the one who would 
reject morality, then, is to explain how the core of ethics and humanity itself should remain 
intact without morality.
The proper place of morality: the introduction to ethics
Saving morality! 42
! If it is true that both human beings and ethics need morality in the sense that they have 
morality at their essence, then perhaps a better approach to morality is to search for its 
wisdoms rather than to cast it out to eliminate our confusions about it. This section will try to 
show how morality can suggest an accurate self-understanding of oneself as an ethical being. 
It also will try to show that morality cares that human beings develop an agreeable 
psychological composition with respect to ethical life. Finally, it will be posited that morality 
quite literally is an introduction to ethics, in that this is the likely point of entry into ethical life 
for human beings. Ultimately it is suggested here that these things, which are essential to 
ethics, are best (perhaps only) provided by morality; and the one who desires to rid human 
life of morality needs to explain how else these crucial elements should be found in ethics.
! It has been said139 that a true understanding of oneself is the highest of wisdoms. Part 
of what has been suggested in this chapter (and this work as a whole) is that morality puts 
human beings in touch with some very deep truths about their nature and about the world - 
truths that are often sacrificed or ignored, along with their benefits, in ethical theories that 
undervalue or leave out morality. But of course, truths by themselves often bring little 
advantage to the soul,140 which might be why this man who esteemed self-understanding 
thought that this necessarily brought along with it a “humble estimate of oneself.”141 Humility 
has over time become less and less viewed as essential to ethical virtue, but if our intuitions 
about moral law and loss are true, then it really is necessary. At least part of what moral loss 
works to show is the position of frailty that human beings are in with respect to their moral 
agency, and why simple confidence does not restore ethical conviction.142 When moral loss 
dominates a situation, and the moral law goes unfulfilled, the appropriate reaction is not to 
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shake fists at the law for being oppressive and impossible, and subsequently disown it. For 
human beings really do believe in the moral law, or else they should not be so upset when they 
fail by its standards; indeed, it is their own standards that they fail by. To attempt, on these 
sentiments, to distance oneself from the truth of moral law is a self-betrayal; and the one who 
realizes that he is far off from the mark of the admirable moral agent will only add to the 
disparity in trying to change or throw out the mark. To be able to accept responsibility for, 
learn in the midst of and move on from moral shortcomings - and do these with grace and 
humility - are often times the first steps of ethical development. Morality shows that these 
must be an aspiration of any respectable ethical theory, and any theory that would like to 
leave out morality will need to present another way of developing these capacities.
! Of course, if the only function of morality were to present accurately the difficulties of 
ethical life, there would be good reason to feel begrudgingly toward it, for it would serve only 
to be the constant source of unconfident souls. The apprehension of ethical truths alone does 
not usually edify the soul, but this does not mean that ethical truths are simply unhelpful143 in 
the cultivation of ethical conviction. A mere recognition of the ethical truth of moral loss and 
law does not alone produce ethical conviction, but accompanying truths - for example, 
humility - might. But what this ethical conviction (and perhaps the truth of humility itself) 
hinges on is the human reaction to the more primary truths presented them. The reactions of 
human beings to morality matter, because morality is our first impression of ethics. The 
compulsively unfaithful husband who feels the moral impulse not to seek a divorce, and 
subsequently suppresses this impulse in an attempt to free himself from his marital 
shortcomings by nonetheless obtaining the divorce, is not likely to find ethical conviction in 
any direction that he acts. But if in the face of his moral struggles he rather seeks a means to 
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be at peace with the deep impulses of morality (in the case of humility, perhaps by a 
confession of his frailty), the prospect of ethical conviction is greater.144
! It is worth noting that this ethical conviction does not necessarily mean a fulfillment of 
or conformity to the moral law, for one honest look at the ideal of perfection represented in 
the moral law should show that one will never measure up. Such a law could not be about 
justifications at all, and in fact, what the law/loss relation should reveal is that the common 
quest to obtain moral worth under the letter of the law is a foolish one. If virtue is indeed 
something attainable, morality shows that it will not be so via any amount of conformity to the 
law.145 This might at first glance be taken as another reason to look for a way out of the 
morality system. It is unclear why one should keep the depressing outlook that prophesies 
constant moral failure. But there is an outlook that sees a more positive contribution by 
morality to the human ethical life, and it has to do with a certain kind of ethical freedom. First, 
the impossible weight of the moral law actually can result in freedom from the poisonous 
desire to seek justification under the law; indeed it should be found a self-evincing feature of 
the law that it cannot be about justifications, as it will only provide a lack therein. So it seems 
that the search for moral justification, which many suppose to be oppressive, is actually an 
institution that morality works to free human beings from. Second, the peace of ethical 
knowledge found in morality must provide at least some of the confidence of ethical 
conviction. Though no amount or quality of reasons could fill one with absolute certainty 
toward a course of action, the one who moves with ethical conviction on some level must truly 
know that the action is acceptable. The moral law provides hard and fast intuitions about right 
and wrong, and these must be at least part of ethical knowledge. Such freedoms, among 
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others, can be a source of great joy that morality sometimes reigns supreme over ethical 
conviction.
~
! Philosophers and laymen alike have often used morality to invite misconceptions of 
human life into ethics, and also of ethics into human life. The Kant/Williams discourse 
provides a rich backdrop on which to consider these misconceptions. But the misconceptions 
of morality involved are just as numerous and just as serious. One thing that the Kant/
Williams discourse shows is this: that ethics can be neither contained by nor cultivated 
without morality. Though much of Williams’ critique of Kantian morality is quite astute, the 
philosophical and ethical wisdoms of morality abound in spite of these. Morality understands 
the fundamental condition of moral loss, and the sometimes irreducible quandaries that this 
condition places human beings in. It understands the nature of the moral law, and the 
intricacies that the levels of letter and spirit invite into human life. Perhaps more importantly, 
it understands the uncompromising relationship between moral loss and moral law, and how 
the human navigation of this relationship leads into the ethical realm via giving rise to ethical 
conviction. Finally, for all of its pressures, morality abounds in valuable wisdoms for the one 
discovering that the human soul occupies a place of ethical significance in the world. It is 
responsible for pointing out, grounding and providing a framework for some of the most 
fundamental truths about the world and human beings; and these are essential to any viable 
ethical theory and sensible conception of human life.
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Postscript
! Considering that the title of this work is Saving morality: Why we cannot, and why we must, 
there was not herein much discussion about the actual salvation of morality. The main title 
Saving morality is straightforwardly inspired by Williams’ thought that “we would be better off 
without” morality.146 Williams’ Ethics and the Limits makes it so that any philosopher who 
wants even to mention morality as a legitimate ethical-philosophical notion, must first salvage 
it from very serious criticisms. So there is first the point that morality should be in some sort of 
very grave danger, and it was a point of the first chapter of this work to show that Williams’ 
criticisms present such a danger. 
! The subtitle of the work is more open textured, having two parts, the first of which 
asks why we cannot save morality. In a straightforward way, this just makes the main title more 
weighty, suggesting that Williams has raised such damning criticisms that there could be no 
salvation for morality. The end of the first chapter makes a less straightforward interpretation, 
that salvation is proportional to condemnation.147 The second chapter works to show that 
morality is not in quite the danger that we might have supposed after being exposed to 
Williams’ critique of morality. The first part of the subtitle deepens the question on another 
level, the level of who cannot save morality. Williams’ point that “morality is not an invention 
of philosophers”148 is relevant here. He is right: philosophers were not responsible for the 
creation of morality, but they shall likewise not be responsible for the destruction of it, unless 
they do away with humanity altogether.
! The second part of the subtitle adds a confusing clause, asking why we must save 
morality after it has just been stated that we cannot. But this clause clarifies the who of saving 
morality, and it is certainly not philosophers, at least in the sense that philosophers have some 
special skills to save morality which other human beings lack. Kant’s conception of the moral 
law as inherent in human beings is important for this work (especially the second chapter), 
and thus in a way, all human beings save the moral law by merely existing. But the we also 
contains a what, and that is ethics. It is a position of this work that to sacrifice morality is to 
compromise crucial ethical notions (such as loss, law, and conviction), possibly even human being 
and life. So it appears that ethics itself - along with human beings - must save morality if they 
are to be what they are.
! For all of this semantic play, this work has made frequent use of inconclusive language 
such as “suggests,” “points toward,” “hints at,” “directs,” and “shows” among others. The 
simple answer to the two questions of the subtitle of the work is probably something like, 
“because it is the introduction to ethics.” I did not take it to be crucial for the main argument 
to provide any operational definition of introduction, but there are a few points worth working 
out concerning just what could be involved in morality as the introduction to ethics. The notion 
might best be taken as a colloquial one, and we might attach many qualities to it. I believe that 
four such qualities required of an introduction are leverage, simplicity, modesty, and 
inspiration.149
! By leverage is meant the characteristic of an introduction that it is in some sense 
compelling. Here it may be difficult to see morality as an introduction and yet not as playing 
the game of the Archimedean point. But an introduction needs no analytically objective 
Saving morality! 49
grounds to have leverage; it needs only some manner of captivation, and also a door or 
pathway leading into what it introduces. This work has presented the law/loss relationship as 
leverage for morality. Leverage is for the half-convinced; and part of the role of an 
introduction is probably to finesse (and thereby in some sense, obscure) the boundaries. So it 
becomes unclear, and perhaps unimportant, what counts as inside or outside the moral realm. 
! By simplicity is meant that this leverage should be found straightforward. Introductions 
present simple, foundational points about the whole subject, although they do not need to 
touch on all of the points - even the essential ones - about the subject. This is found in morality 
mostly in that it requires for its essence only lawfulness aimed at the good will, and that the 
fundamental notions of law/loss and letter/spirit are basically compatible with this essence. 
Morality does not need elaborate structures of obligation governed by reason150 in order to 
fulfill its role as an introduction to ethics.
! It should not be a problem that these notions cannot explain the whole of ethics, which 
is connected to the third element, modesty, by which is meant that an introduction knows is 
proper place in the larger context of the whole project. It does not suppose itself to be 
responsible for holding up or completing the integrity of the entire project. Though morality 
sometimes holds our deepest impulses, it need not hold all of them all of the time. This should 
be found, among other things, in morality’s proper refusal to delegate blame or try to reduce 
human life to rational obligations. Rather than overstep its bounds, a proper introduction 
finally provides inspiration to progress and explore further the project that it introduces. The 
main inspiration suggested in this work is the way in which the fundamental notions of 
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morality teach the central ethical notion of conviction, and in this way morality encourages 
individuals to delve deeper into the ethical.
!
 ! One might be left wondering what has been meant here by conviction (particularly 
ethical conviction), and it is a point of this project that ethical conviction is not filled all the 
way out. While a loose definition of conviction was provided151 with the idea that conviction is 
the force of the soul that reveals what one is willing to live and die for, a few specific things 
were suggested about ethical conviction based upon the main argument of this work that 
morality, as an introduction to ethics, teaches ethical conviction. First, the environment in 
which ethical conviction is cultivated has been illustrated in the law/loss and letter/spirit 
tensions presented in morality. So it is the sort of thing that navigates fundamental tensions of 
human life, and as such will always have reference to morality. Second, ethical conviction is 
found necessary in ordinary and tragic instances alike, and it in part works to develop 
integrity (even over practical necessity) in how human beings approach these different kinds 
of instances. Third, some necessary features of conviction have been identified, such as 
confidence, importance and knowledge. Finally, conviction itself is a notion central to ethics, 
and perhaps the central notion.
! The first chapter of this work hopefully showed that Williams’ criticisms of morality, 
however serious and damaging, do leave morality alive. The second chapter tried to take this 
bit of breath left in morality in order to reexamine it in a fairly raw state (indeed, Williams’ 
criticisms of morality may have been necessary for stripping away all that is not essential to 
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it). It was then posited what is required for morality essentially, and a few quite basic and 
simple notions that should be found at its core. The third chapter then tried to show that this 
simple view of morality holds it primarily as an introduction to ethics via conviction, and that 
is where the real argument of the main text ends.
! Of course, there is probably an infinite list of related projects, many of which are 
important. For example, this work does not deliver final verdicts on either Kant152 or 
Williams, or their followers. It does not explain what the essential place of the often elevated 
notions of reason and obligation should be in morality. It does not work out exactly how 
something that rejects fundamental pillars of Kantian morality can still be considered morality. 
When I presented the first draft of this work to an adviser of mine, the first questioning 
feedback I received was that the title of the work seems to violate one of the cardinal rules of 
morality, that “ought” implies “can”. This is telling of the project as a whole, that it has been 
willing to question and even throw out many notions long considered central to morality, in 
order to see more clearly the true nature of morality. Acknowledging this, I still hope that 
what has been done here should not be found a project lacking in positive contributions, 
because I hope that its largest contribution to philosophy is - like morality to the project of 
ethics - the doors that it opens up and work that it leaves to be done.
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NOTES
1. Preface
!
! 1 Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) xiii-xiv.
! 2 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985) 174.
! 3 Of course, things simply being contrary to preferences is probably not sufficient for constituting a real 
moral issue; but it certainly is necessary. In any case, we would not hold our preferences unless in some sense we 
supposed that we ought to hold them. It might be objected that arousing this intuition has the danger of conflating 
desires with oughts; and the third chapter of this work will hold that at times this boundary is rightfully 
obscured.
! 4 This is a well-known theme of Kant’s work, but one place it comes out with particular strength is in his 
Practical Philosophy (Ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
5:152.
! 5 Williams’ discussion of conviction comes in Ethics and the Limits 168-171.
! 6 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 1.
! 7 Admittedly, this is not obvious and remains to be shown; and it is a claim that enters my argument near 
the end of the second chapter.
2. Morality and why we cannot save it
! 8 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985) 174.
! 9 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits 196.
! 10 It is certainly admitted that these points might be broken down or condensed further.
! 11 My internal harmony may be likened to what Williams calls “Ethical Consistency” in his Problems of 
the Self (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1973) 166-186.
! 12 Williams, Ethics and the Limits, 176.
! 13 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 175. It will be a later question of this work whether morality really 
must hold this position.
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! 14 Though this is a main theme of Williams’ work in general, what is relevant here is that I take this to be 
a main point of Williams’ “Ethical Consistency” in his Problems of the Self 166-186. 
! 15 I have borrowed and will continue to borrow this phrase from Williams, Ethics and the Limits 188.
! 16 Williams’ dealing with this Greek tragedy comes in his Problems of the Self 173.
! 17 The experience of regret is of large importance to Williams. Along with the notion that “there was no 
better thing to be done,” an important aspect of these sentiments seems to be the thought that “it was me who did 
it.” This appears in Williams’ discussion of regret in his “Moral Luck” in Moral Luck (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 27-30.
! 18 In Williams’ view, most moralists will insist either that one of the conflicting moral demands did not 
constitute an actual obligation, or that any regret after choosing the best course of action is irrational, or perhaps 
both. But these are both “falsifying of moral thought” and do not reflect accurately the human condition, 
Problems of the Self 183-184.
! 19 Williams analyzes and refutes this pillar of the morality system in Ethics and the Limits 181-187. It 
will be a later suggestion of this work that this need is specific to the Kantian variety of morality.
! 20 It is sometimes remarked that Kantian duty instructs individuals to be morally upright regardless of 
reasons not to be. Here has been chosen a different expression, for two reasons. First, Kant cannot mean that 
duty is without regard to other reasons, as he has already given these attention. Second, duty could not carry 
with it overriding reasons if the will had no other reasons before it to be overridden. In any case, Kant’s intuition 
that reasons are necessary for morality will be upheld in this work.
! 21 This phrase is taken from Williams’ “Persons, character and morality” in his Moral Luck, 18, during a 
wider discourse on morality and interpersonal relations, 16-19. The phrase itself does not do much of the 
argumentative lifting, but it does express what Williams seems to find strange about morality in certain 
situations. It is a question, though, whether this really should be found strange, and also whether this is the real 
danger of moral deliberation.
! 22 Williams, Moral Luck 18. One might wonder whether this argument conflates the ultimate 
justification (and motivation) of an action with what we expect (or find) the spouse to be thinking at the time of 
deliberation. It certainly is justification enough that it is his spouse, but that does not mean that there is no further 
justification possible or that this justification is ultimate.
! 23 Like regret and interpersonal relations, there seems to be something deeper at stake here for Williams, 
namely, the involvement of human emotions in the ethical life. It is easy to see how Williams’ criticisms run 
together, as his point that the morality system is impersonal can be seen here.
! 24 The concept of “moral luck” was developed both by Williams in his “Moral Luck,” Moral Luck 20-39, 
and by Thomas Nagel in his “Moral Luck,” Mortal Questions. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979) 24-38.
! 25 Among other places, Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:394. Here Kant seems to be saying that things 
external to the will can neither make it good nor detract from its goodness.
! 26 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:446.
! 27 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:387.
! 28 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:446.
! 29 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:4452-453.
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! 30 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:459.
! 31 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:4.
! 32 Kant, Practical Philosophy 8:456.
! 33 Kant, Practical Philosophy 8:458.
! 34 Laws are self-imposed in that a truly free will must be unaffected by external causes. As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, the manner in which the moral law counts as self-legislated may be more open-
ended than Kant leads one to believe.
! 35 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:447.
! 36 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:6.
! 37 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:449.
! 38 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:450. “Reckoning of” might here be replaced with “reason to” or “reason 
for,” according to Kant’s language.
! 39 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:455. It has often been said that there is a gap between Kant’s claim that a 
free will conforms to universal law, and the claim that human beings ought to evaluate their maxims according to 
such a law. Kant seems to take this infamous link for granted, stating that this is the simple compulsion of a truly 
free will. The nuance in the reciprocation, as identified by Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:4, is this: that freedom is 
the reckoning of being of moral law, and moral law is the reckoning of understanding of freedom.
! 40 Kant, Practical Philosophy 8:458.
! 41 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:29-30. I later try to get the moral law off the ground from an almost 
opposite angle, with a reciprocal relationship between moral law and moral loss; and I hope this should guard 
against the concerns raised by moral luck.
! 42 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:397.
! 43 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:390. Kant might be read as saying that acting in conformity with the law 
is of no value. Such a position will find no support here; but it is in any case unclear whether this is a position to 
which morality is necessarily committed. In either case, Williams will dispute even the basic claim that higher 
esteem is always granted to the dutiful individual. 
! 44 It is worth wondering how loose these conceptions are allowed to be, and whether morality must take 
start from them in the way that Kant does.
! 45 Nagel breaks down moral luck into four kinds in his “Moral Luck,” Mortal Questions. Though this 
breakdown illuminates many things about the concept, the concept and problem of moral luck is here taken to be 
fairly straightforward, and as such does not require much exposition.
! 46 Williams, “Moral Luck,” Moral Luck 39.
! 47 I will later demote obligation in favor of “conviction,” as I find it a more adequate expression of the 
notion for many reasons, one of which is that it defends against Williams’ confused criticism that Kantian moral 
obligation does not “go all the way down” in the way that practical necessity must, Ethics and the Limits 188.
! 48 What follows is certainly not an exhaustive account. The primary distinction, if there is one, is that 
obligation is the necessity of action, while duty just is the action, Kant, Practical Philosophy 6:222.
! 49 Kant, Practical Philosophy xiv. This is an interpretative point made by Allen Wood.
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! 50 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:159; 6:224; 6:390-96. For example, the different duties that comprise an 
action; perfect and imperfect duties; grounds of obligation and obligations themselves; obligations of precedence 
and obligations of prevalence; ethical duties, duties of virtue, and duties of right; wide and narrow duties.
! 51 Kant, Practical Philosophy 8:13.
! 52 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:391. Specifically, to empirical practical concepts without consideration of 
their origins.
! 53 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 178. Williams associates this, in Kant’s terminology, with the 
characteristic of the moral imperative being categorical.
! 54 These three levels of the supremacy of morality appear in Williams, Ethics and the Limits on pages 
177, 179, and 180, respectively.
! 55 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 184. This work might agree with this statement if applied to morality 
rather than to ethics. It must be kept in mind here the distinction that Williams makes between the wider realm 
of ethics and the narrower ethical variety of morality; and this aptitude for comprehensive vision is a defining 
characteristic of how he distinguishes the two.
! 56 This is a combination of thoughts from Williams. The notion of projects is provided explicitly in his 
“Persons, character and morality” in Moral Luck 5. The notion that importance is grounded in these personal 
projects is found in his Ethics and the Limits 186. The idea that this should be placed at the center of ethical 
considerations goes all the way back to his Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972) 81.
! 57 Williams supposes that he “needs only three things of” the notion of importance, and that “it does not 
matter… that this notion is poorly understood,” Ethics and the Limits 186. The third chapter will present these 
stances as quite significant, and question them both.
! 58 Williams, Moral Luck 23.
! 59 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 196. That morality is deeply rooted will find agreement in this work; 
that it must hold a misconception of human life will not.
! 60 Williams, Moral Luck 28.
! 61 Williams, Moral Luck 18.
! 62 Perhaps, a morality in which obligation reigns supreme sometimes.
! 63 Williams, Moral Luck 3.
! 64 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 68.
! 65 Of course, without morality, one might wonder where these justifications are to be found.
! 66 Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993) 69.
! 67 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 177. I will argue this claim in the following chapters. In this case, 
morality primarily provides a way to evaluate actions, but this does not necessarily lead to a demand to heap guilt 
on those who go astray (including oneself).
! 68 Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 42. This 
claim might not be found entirely true in the next chapter, as some of the focus is taken off of reasons.
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! 69 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:393. It is especially interesting, considering the modern dichotomy 
between the right and the good, that Kant actually begins his pursuit with a consideration of goodness.
! 70 This claim, along with the claim of unconditional value, are the two important aspects of the good will 
that Williams criticizes - much more so than he seems to criticize the content of Kant’s good will.
! 71 It is certainly worth wondering whether or not this is sufficient for a good will, and whether morality 
must hold this conception of the good will.
! 72 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:397. It is notable here is that the relationship is one of analytical 
clarification, rather than one of real metaphysical support or proof of existence.
! 73 Kant, Practical Philosophy 6:222.
! 74 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:396.
! 75 Kant, Practical Philosophy 8:11.
! 76 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:15-16. See also Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:120-121, where practical 
reason is shown as supreme to speculative reason.
! 77 Kant, Practical Philosophy 6:227.
! 78 Kant, Practical Philosophy 6:223.
! 79 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:400.
! 80 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:29, 5:31-32. This anticipates a later point about the defective nature of 
human language, and the toll it takes on our understanding of morality and ethics.
! 81 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:152.
! 82 For Kant, perhaps the three most crucial foundations that his philosophy makes are God, freedom, 
and immortality. These happen to be three crucial points of divergence for Williams and Kant - however 
unaddressed they may be today - as Williams does not assume or believe in any of these things. One of the main 
points of Williams’ “God, morality and prudence” Williams, Morality 63-72, is that the complications with belief 
in God make many parts of morality problematic; and even if God existed, that might not make a difference for 
morality. Interestingly, Williams here brings to his defense an insight from Kant, that morality might be prior to 
God. Williams’ work on moral luck compromises his belief in free agency in a very serious way. As for 
immortality, Williams’ Makropulos case, Problems of the Self 82-100, finds that an eternal life would be a 
meaningless life; in the very least, though death is an evil, immortality is a worse idea. This disagreement between 
Kant and Williams is an important yet unaddressed one, as Kantian moral philosophy presupposes an unlimited 
amount of time to attain moral perfection. With these in mind, it should not be difficult to anticipate some of the 
ways in which these two philosophers might end up talking past each other.
! 83 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:389.
! 84 Kant, Practical Philosophy 4:390.
! 85 Kant in many places (for example, Practical Philosophy 4:389) seems to claim that we basically know 
our duties and laws, and I believe that he is correct to assume so. He is rather interested in the essence and 
nature of duty, and what it has to do primarily with the good will, but also with reason, freedom, and law.
! 86 Important here are the two chapters, “The Archimedean Point” and “Foundations: Practical Reason” 
in Williams, Ethics and the Limits 22-29 and 54-70, respectively.
! 87 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 54.
Saving morality! 59
! 88 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 174.
3. Re-viewing morality, a simple institution!
! 89 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985) 1.
! 90 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:152.
! 91 It is not a point of this work to discuss which intuitions human beings are made aware of first (law or 
loss), as a proper understanding of their relationship shows that these two sets of intuitions in many ways 
develop together.
! 92 These differences have to do with where the standard comes from, where the standard is applied, and 
to what end the standard is held.
! 93 This is an ordinary example from our daily lives, which Williams might consider amoral. There is 
herein a divergence with Williams on his use of tragedy to inform our ethical intuition, which will be filled out in 
the next chapter. A few things in particular interest me about these situations. First, that both men care about 
their place in line, and may feel that they have a rightful claim to it. Second, that both men assume that the other 
knows about what would be proper behavior in this situation, as opposed to another (the second man would not 
reply about being allowed to break a promise, for example). Third, that mere societal conditioning is not 
sufficient for the existence of these intuitions.
! 94 Indeed, it might not even be the goal to make morally acceptable choices.
! 95 And perhaps also of Kant.
! 96 Although a transgression is not a source of blame for the moral law, as blame is something that human 
beings do.
! 97 Williams, Problems of the Self 173.
! 98 Indeed, it was a notion of importance not only in his philosophy, but in his life, from where much of 
his philosophy came, as portrayed by James Miller, Examined Lives: from Socrates to Nietzsche (New York, 
NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011) 257-285.
! 99 Earlier I was discussing the moral law as though it is not a product of human manufacturing, and that 
there can be found no fault in it - and that is true. The faulty workings of the letter of the law come when human 
beings attempt to represent it, primarily by language, which is perhaps one of the greatest institutional failures of 
human beings. The moment the maxims of moral law becomes tangled up with human language, they are bound 
to fail in innumerable ways.
! 100 Indeed, this is where the majority of the action of the moral realm occurs - in the spirit, which is 
perhaps between the lines of the letter.
! 101 Kant, Practical Philosophy 5:161-5:162.
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! 102 It is does not yet need to be asserted that the spirit of the law has primacy over the letter of the law. 
As will be suggested later, the letter of the law has an equally important role, that it informs us of moral loss, 
presses the weight of self-legislation and conviction upon us, and in all of this points toward the true spirit of the 
law, which ultimately leads out of the law entirely.
! 103 Consider our understanding of civil and common law. On the level of the letter, the United States law 
prohibiting the limitation of free speech directly conflicts the law prohibiting discussing the assassination of the 
President. But surely we do not suppose that this conflict compromises the integrity of the Constitution. Rather, 
we suppose that the law against assassination speech holds some spirit of the Constitution (perhaps, the 
democratic system that it favors) which the law promoting free speech also holds.
! 104 Williams’ brief discussion of something like conviction is found in conjunction with a consideration of 
his notion of “confidence” in his Ethics and the Limits 168-171.
! 105 Certainly in this discourse by Williams, but also in some ways by Kant as well.
! 106 An implication here is that Williams is wrong to discard the existence of Ross’s prima facie obligations, 
as he does in his Ethics and the Limits 176-182f. To be sure, not all moral conflicts could be prima facie, but this 
does not mean that none of them are. It is simply that prima facie conflicts would be ones that apply only to one 
level (either letter or spirit) of the law, while real moral conflicts must present a conflict on both levels which is 
not reducible by some cooperation between them, and also that damages the ethical character of the persons 
involved beyond what may be accounted for by moral loss.
! 107 This is not to say that addressing moral conflicts is simply a matter of delegating and dispelling. 
Though they are few, there are indeed true moral conflicts. The next chapter will show that though morality does 
not fully contain what is necessary to deal with these, it does serve to point toward a better equipped institution.
! 108 This is the place that Kant gave reason - the very reason for reason - in his philosophy; and when his 
philosophy is considered, reason should be given that place in it - no more, no less. It is not necessary then, as 
Williams supposes, that obligation “works to secure reliability.”
! 109 The point here being something of an echo to a prior position of mine, that it is of utmost importance 
to pay attention to philosopher’s comments on their own work.
! 110 Kant, Practical Philosophy 1:151. It is interesting to note (just as it is interesting to note about Kant’s 
good will) that Kant’s consideration of moral worth here seems to be about “pure virtue.” I take these two 
considerations, among others, to be indications that Kantian moral philosophy may be much closer to virtue 
ethics than is usually assumed.
! 111 Kant, Practical Philosophy 1:152.
! 112 This may be found to be at odds with Kantian philosophy, although I take it to be a point of his in 
declaring the purpose of reason. Though obligation and reason may be at the forefront of the letter of the law, 
and its representation of the moral law to human beings, I find no need that obligation and reason be given any 
higher place than this in morality.
! 113 This should not be taken to say that the moral law is malleable in a weak way. It has more to do with 
the gaps of fortitude in the human will, which the spirit of the law is apt to bridge, be it through plain letter of 
law or profound conviction of spirit.
! 114 Williams, Moral Luck 18. The next chapter will try to suggest that the supposed moral thought that 
one’s actions are permissible would actually be a thought without content as far as the law is concerned.
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! 115 One explanation in this example is that the law might simply suggest, out of letter, that the husband 
attempt to save them both (though in a certain order). But the spirit might just as quickly suggest that he only 
save his wife, and pay no mind to the peril of the stranger. Both are equally troubling ethical positions that result 
not from excessive but rather insufficient thought.
! 116 Although at times the moral law may impress itself upon individuals as if this were true. This may 
have something to do with the understanding of the law that if one portion of it is transgressed, the whole body is 
transgressed.
! 117 This is Williams’ presentation of blame in morality, Practical Philosophy 192. Recall here that in 
Kant’s view, obligations make use of overriding reasons.
! 118 The third is a point about morality and justifications, which is taken up in the next chapter.
! 119 This is of course directly contrary to Williams’ view in Problems of the Self 173.
4. Ethical conviction and morality
! 120 His account of the former comes in Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 167-173, and his account of the latter comes in pages 
182-187f. I take it that he uses both of them in their colloquial sense.
! 121 Williams states that reflection, deliberation and certainty all fail to be “helpful in face of actual lack of 
ethical conviction,” Ethics and the Limits 169.
! 122 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 170.
! 123 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 170. It is likely that this is important for Williams to state because he 
must correct the mistaken standard of morality that obligation is the only viable way of ethical living. It seems 
that Williams here advocates a kind of ethical pluralism, holding that confidence is one promising way to arrive 
at ethical conviction.
! 124 What the husband desires is for the content of ethical conviction (the force which can inform what 
one is willing to live and die for) to be filled out for him in that moment.
! 125 This is related to, though not the same as, the concern that Williams sees himself addressing when he 
suggests that “faith in cognitive certainly” does not help us to know “what we are supposed to be certain about,” 
Ethics and the Limits 170. Though Williams is correct, it is the content of the conviction, rather than the 
certainty, that matters.
! 126 Williams states at the introduction of this notion that this is of no consequence, Ethics and the Limits 
182.
! 127 As he works out in Ethics and the LImits 182f.
! 128 Both of these positions can be found in Williams, Ethics and the Limits 182-183.
! 129 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 174, 196.
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! 130 This should be found related to Kant’s positions concerning the purity and freedom of self-legislation, 
and lawfulness therefore being the moral force of utmost compulsion. Adherence to the rule-giving form must be 
genuine, and can therefore be trusted as a measure of moral worth. Although this work will diverge in suggesting  
that it is the integrity of the ethical conviction, and not the mere use of the rule-giving form alone, that is 
virtuous.
! 131 Perhaps in being a too far-reaching picture of morality, and an incomplete picture of ethics.
! 132 Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972) 79. In citing this notion from others, Williams emphasizes “the idea that there is a discovery to be 
made here, rather than a decision.”
! 133 Williams himself criticizes this approach to ethical conviction in Ethics and the Limits 169-170.
! 134 Williams, Morality 79.
! 135  Williams, Ethics of Limits 182. 
! 136 This is interesting, especially granted that Williams’ confidence is supposed to do away with self-
deception, Ethics and the Limits 171.
! 137 This is Williams’ final verdict on morality, Ethics and the Limits 192.
! 138 Indeed, perhaps the very questions mentioned by Williams, Ethics and the Limits 171
! 139 While many have said something like this, the words I have in mind are usually attributed to the late 
Medieval Catholic monk Thomas á Kempis, The Inner Life (New York, NY: Penguin Great Ideas, 2004) 3-4.
! 140 A point which Williams seems to acknowledge in his discussion of conviction, Ethics and the Limits 
168-169.
! 141 Á Kempis, The Inner Life 3.
! 142 Humility may, in its own right, provide a certain kind of confidence.
! 143 This is part of Williams’ position with respect to ethical conviction, Ethics and the Limits 169-170.
! 144 This introduces the notion of peace that, like humility, is often left out of ethical theories despite its 
necessity and helpfulness. It is a position of this work, though an incomplete one, that morality acquaints and 
familiarizes us with these central ethical sentiments in ways impossible without morality.
! 145 And this is a Kantian wisdom.
5. Postscript
! 146 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985) 174. He admits here that he is working from a subjective interpretation of what he takes morality to be.
! 147 I say that “what is in no danger requires no salvation,” 17.
! 148 Williams, Ethics and the Limits 174.
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! 149 These are probably not technical terms, and could be well substituted by whatever conjures the 
sentiments I am trying to.
! 150 In fact, one of the subtler points of this work is that the whole discourse concerning moral worth 
might be a category mistake, since morality cannot properly be about justifications for human beings in the sense 
normally attributed therein.
! 151 On page 29 of this work.
! 152 Though the work does seem to treat Kant as something like an overzealous introduction to morality.
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